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GENERATOR LIABILITY UNDER SUPERFUND FOR
CLEAN-UP OF ABANDONED HAZARDOUS
WASTE DUMPSITES
In response to the well-publicized toxic waste problem, Con-
gress recently enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,1 commonly known as
the "Superfund Act." The Superfund Act establishes a $1.6 bil-
lion "Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund" 2 to finance
prompt government clean-up of abandoned hazardous chemical
waste dumpsites. The Act authorizes fund representatives to sue
responsible private parties for reimbursement of clean-up costs
incurred by the government at each dumpsite.3 Largely because
the Superfund Act was the product of a last-minute congressional
compromise,4 however, the precise liability standard it imposes on
these responsible parties is unclear.
Due to the nature of the toxic waste disposal industry, in many
cases the only solvent, locatable parties with any connection to
dumpsites targeted for clean-up under the Act will be chemical
companies that, well before Superfund's enactment, generated the
toxic wastes contained in those sites.5 Although some have argued
that invoking Superfund's liability provisions against such gen-
erators would be. an impermissibly retroactive application of the
Act,0 this Comment concludes that, to the contrary, retroactive
application of Superfund to hold pre-enactment hazardous waste
generators liable for clean-up costs was intended by Congress and
is well within constitutional boundaries. This Comment will also
explore the legislative history of the Superfund Act to ascertain
the intended scope of the Act's liability provisions when applied
to such pre-enactment generators.
I. BACKGROUND: TiE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM AND
THE SUPERFUND "SOLUTION"
A. The Problem
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
estimated in 1979 that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 inactive and
'Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657
(Supp. IV 1980)).
21d. § 9631.
3 Id. § 9607.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.
5 See infra text accompanying and following note 12.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
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uncontrolled hazardous chemical waste sites exist in the United
States.7 Although toxic chemical wastes are no longer being de-
posited in these dumpsites, many of them continue to fester,
smolder, and leak improperly discarded poisons into the environ-
ment.8 The EPA has estimated that it will cost $13.1 billion to
$22.1 billion just to clean up the 1200 to 2000 inactive sites posing
the greatest danger to 'the public health and environment.9
Although most hazardous waste generators '0 disposed of their
wastes themselves on their own premises, thereby simplifying the
problem of locating the party responsible for improper disposal,
approximately twenty to thirty percent of generators have con-
tracted out for disposal in off-site disposal facilities and for trans-
port by independent haulers." Of the 1200 to 2000 most dan-
gerous inactive sites, a significant number are abandoned off-site
facilities whose owners are either insolvent or impossible to lo-
cate.' 2 In addition, the parties who transported and physically
dumped the wastes often were independent disposal companies-
middlemen between the waste generator and the dumpsite owner-
who have also vanished or are insolvent. Thus, the only solvent
and locatable party with any connection to the lingering hazardous
condition is the chemical company that originally generated the
wastes.
Prior to the enactment of Superfund, existing law made the
attachment of clean-up liability to such "non-dumping gener-
ators" -1 quite difficult, if not impossible.' 4 Indeed, several con-
7 Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings on S. 1341 and S. 1480
Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 7
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hazardous Waste Hearings].
8 The EPA estimated in 1979 that approximately 90% of all hazardous wastes
have been disposed of improperly. See Senate Hazardous Waste Hearings, supra
note 7, pt. 3, at 72. Some of the best known examples are the "Love Canal" site
in Niagara Falls, N.Y., the "Valley of the Drums" in Shepardsville, Ky., and the
"Chemical Control site" in Elizabeth, N.J. H.R. RP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. I, at 18 (1980). The report, absent the text of the bill, is reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 6119, 6120.
9 H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 8, at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws at 6123.
10 The term "generator" as used in this Comment and by hazardous waste
experts refers to chemical manufacturers who produce toxic chemical wastes as a
by-product of the chemicals they market.
"1 See Senate Hazardous Waste Hearings, supra note 7, pt. 3, at 72.
12 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 174 (1979).
-a A "non-dumping generator" is a generator that hired a third party to dispose
of its wastes at an off-site facility. A hypothetical discussing such a generator
appears infra text following note 32.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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gressional committees declared in 1980 that existing law was wholly
inadequate to address the serious problem of inactive hazardous
waste site clean-up.'5 The national attention several hazardous
waste disasters had received during the late 1970's,16 finally pro-
vided the political impetus for a response at the federal level.
B. The Superfund "Solution"
Congress's answer to the hazardous waste problem was the
passage of the Superfund Act. The Act established a $1.6 billion
"Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund," 17 to be financed by
taxes levied over a five-year period on the oil and chemical indus-
tries and by a smaller contribution from the general revenues.'8
The fund is to be used to finance prompt government clean-up of
hazardous waste sites targeted by a "national contingency plan." 19
In the past, the government's lack of any readily available method
to finance the clean-up of hazardous waste sites resulted in the post-
ponement of clean-up efforts until after liability was assessed in
lengthy litigation against responsible private parties. During liti-
gation, of course, toxic wastes further damaged the environment.
In theory, at least,20 Superfund will eliminate such delays because
15 H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 8, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & Al. NEws at 6120; S. Rs . No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1980).
16For example, the "Love Canal" disaster in Niagara Falls, N.Y., involved
such serious leakage of hazardous wastes that it became the first non-natural disaster
to be declared a national disaster. The tremendous damage and health hazards
caused by the Love Canal site were publicized nationally. For a chronology of
events surrounding the Love Canal disaster, see 126 CONG. Eec. S14,969-71 (daily
ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Moynihan).
1742 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. IV 1980).
18 Of the estimated $1.6 billion fund, approximately $1.38 billion will come
from taxes imposed on crude oil, petroleum products, and other chemicals that are
the raw materials used in many of the processes that generate hazardous wastes.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (Supp. IV 1980). The remaining $220 million will
come from the general revenues, as appropriated over a five-year period. See
42 U.S.C. § 9631(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. IV 1980). This section required the President,
within 180 days of the enactment of Superfund, to revise the existing "national
contingency plan" (for the removal of oil and hazardous substances) to incorporate
the powers created by Superfund. The plan will establish procedures and standards
for responding to hazardous waste releases, including methods for discovering,
investigating, and cleaning up waste sites. Despite the Act's requirement that a
revised plan be adopted by June 1981, such a plan was not adopted until July 12,
1982, after the EPA was compelled by court order to obey the statute. See 13
Euw'T REP. (BNA) 364-65 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 31, 180 (1982).
2 0 As one commentator has noted, however, implementation of the Superfund
Act poses substantial practical and administrative problems. The Act, it is argued,
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the government will have both the authority and the funds to
begin clean-up efforts as soon as a hazardous site is targeted. Liti-
gation awards will then be used to replenish the fund.
C. Problems Regarding Generator Liability
The importance of replenishing the fund under the Super-
fund scheme should not be minimized. The fund is of limited
size,21 and its monies will be exhausted quickly, thwarting future
clean-up efforts, unless Superfund's new liability-assessing provisions
succeed. The Act authorizes the government to sue responsible
private parties to recover the clean-up costs the fund has expended
at targeted sitesY2 Under this liability provision, the government
may attempt to recover clean-up costs from waste generators,n
dumpsite owners and operators,2 4 and parties who transported waste
materials to the dumpsite.2 5 Dumpsite owners and transporters,
however, will often prove to be either insolvent or impossible to
locate.28 Hence, in many cases the success of the government's vital
efforts to replenish the fund will depend upon whether the chemical
company that generated the wastes can be held liable. This
Comment will address the effect of Superfund on such past waste
generators.
Part II explores the issue whether Superfund can be applied
retroactively to impose liability on pre-enactment waste generators
permits potential targets to stall and possibly even prevent the initiation of govern-
ment clean-up efforts. See generally Mott, Defenses Under Superfund, 13 NAT.
REsoumc~s L. NEwsLET R, May 1981, at 1, 17-19. This Comment will not address
the many pre-clean-up administrative difficulties the government will face under
Superfund, but will concentrate instead on post-clean-up defenses to liability
available to generators.
21 Former Representative Robert C. Eckhardt, who was actively involved in the
consideration of the Superfund legislation, has written that the fund is less than
half the size of what is needed merely to commence the "gigantic" program of
hazardous waste clean-up. Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste
Control, 33 BAYLoR L. REv. 263 (1981).
2242 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980).
23 Id. § 9607(a)(3).
24 Id. § 9607(a) (2).
25 Id. § 9607(a) (4). Although the Act thus permits recovery of government
clean-up costs from several responsible parties, and also permits recovery of natural
resources damages in some circumstances, it has been severely criticized for its
failure to permit recovery by private victims for personal damages caused by
improper waste disposal. See, e.g., Meyer, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims:
RCRA Insurance Regulations and a Not So "Super"Fund Act, 11 ENvTrL. L. 689,
701 (1981); Note, Allocating Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HAxv. L.
REv. 584, 591 (1981).
26 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
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who acted in full compliance with laws existing when their wastes
were generated and disposed of. The Comment demonstrates
that the legislative history and relevant constitutional decisions
permit the imposition of such retroactive liability. The Act must
therefore be analyzed closely to ascertain the liability standard im-
posed upon these past waste generators. Although several cases
have been filed invoking Superfund's liability provisions as a basis
for generator liability,27 there are no decisions that have compre-
hensively interpreted these ambiguous provisions. Thus a detailed
examination of the statutory language and legislative history of the
Act is both necessary and timely. Part III examines Congress's
intent regarding the availability and nature of the Act's third party
causation defense, and concludes that to avoid liability, many pre-
enactment generators who hired independent contractors to dispose
of their wastes need show only that they acted with "due care,"
while future waste generators who use identical disposal procedures
will be strictly liable for damages caused by their wastes. Part IV
discusses whether Superfund imposes joint and several liability on
responsible generators when, as is typical, each generator's wastes
cause an unknown portion of the total damage at a large off-site
dump containing toxic wastes from several different sources. This
Comment argues that Congress intended to impose joint and sev-
eral liability in most cases in which individual defendants cannot
prove their contribution, but that in limited but important cir-
cumstances the courts were left with the power to apportion
damages.
After examining these three problems regarding generator li-
ability, the Comment concludes in Part V that political realities
led to weak, ambiguous final language regarding generator liability.
Courts that wish to aid in the expeditious clean-up of abandoned
dumpsites should not, however, interpret the Act's difficult liability
provisions disingenuously in order to find a deep-pocketed party to
finance clean-up efforts, but should earnestly attempt to discover
the meaning Congress intended for the liability provisions, and
apply the Act accordingly.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., No. 4-80-469 (D.
Minn. filed Sept. 4, 1980); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., No. LR-C-80-109
(E.D. Ark. filed March 4, 1980); United States v. Melvin Wade, No. 79-1426
(E.D. Pa. filed 1979); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., No. 78-C-1004
(N.D. Ill. filed 1978). All of these cases originated under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 (Solid Waste Disposal Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6987 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), but a Superfund count was added after the passage
of the Act.
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II. AaE SUPERFUND'S LIABILITY PROVISIONS IMPERMISSIBLY
RETROACTIVE IF APPLIED TO PRE-ENACTMENT HAZARDOUS
WASTE GENERATORS?
A. Circumstances Giving Rise to a Possible Claim of
Impermissible Retroactivity
Because chemical waste generators may be the only respon-
sible parties not judgment-proof, they are likely targets of govern-
ment suits to replenish the Superfund. When Congress considered
the Superfund Act's liability provisions, the Chemical Manufac-
turers' Association, 28 Senators Domenici, Bentsen, and Baker of
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,29 and
Representatives Stockman 30 and Madigan 31 protested that retro-
active application of these provisions to previously non-negligent
parties 32 would be unfair and possibly unconstitutional. In order
to understand the type of situation in which retroactive application
of Superfund is alleged to be unconstitutional, consider the follow-
ing hypothetical case:
In 1974, Chemco, a chemical manufacturing company, pro-
duced several tanks of Stickychem, a usefui product with the un-
fortunate characteristic of leaving highly toxic residues stuck to the
walls of the tanks in which it is produced. At the close of the
1974 Stickychem production cycle, Chemco decided to discontinue
its production and therefore contracted with Middleman Disposal
Company to have the tanks steam-cleaned and the toxic residues
disposed of. Chemico paid Middleman, a reputable outfit with a
track record of safe disposal, the premium rate for safe cleaning
and disposal. Chemco included in its contract with Middleman
a provision requiring that the wastes be disposed of in a safe,
EPA-certified off-site facility. Middleman, however, was in financial
difficulty at the time and eager to make maximum profit on the
Chemco operation. So Middleman, unbeknownst to Chemco,
subcontracted with Flybynight Dumping Company for the ultimate
disposal of the toxic residues. Instead of incurring the higher cost
of safely disposing the barrels in a sealed dumpsite, Middleman
28 See Senate Hazardous Waste Hearings, supra note 7, at 455.
29 See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 120.
30 See 126 CoNG. REc. H9466-67 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
31 See id. H9465-66.
3 2 A previously "non-negligent party' or "non-negligent generator" is one who
produced hazardous wastes prior to the enactment of Superfund and complied with
all prior existing laws, including common law, in arranging for or carrying out
hazardous waste disposal.
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paid Flybynight a modest fee to get rid of the leaky barrels as it
pleased. Flybynight took the barrels to an industrial backlot called
Quickdump, where they were thrown onto a large, leaking heap
not far from a local stream.
Chemco carefully followed all toxic waste disposal procedures
required by federal and state law, including common law, as it
existed in 1974. 3 In 1975, Middleman and Flybynight went out
of business, and the owner of Quickdump closed the dump, aban-
doned the property, and vanished. In 1982, the EPA discovered
the highly dangerous inactive dumpsite, and cleaned it up using
$1 million from Superfund. The EPA then filed suit against
Chemco under Section 107 of the Superfund Act 3 4 for reimburse-
ment of the government's clean-up costs. Chemco, concerned that
it will be held liable under the Act, 5 now protests that application
of Superfund's new liability provisions to hold it responsible for
1974 actions that were perfectly legal when performed is an imper-
missibly retroactive application of the Act that is unfair, possibly
an ex post facto law, and violative of due process.
B. The Need to Apply Superfund Retroactively
To show that Superfund's liability provisions are impermis-
sibly retroactive, a Chemco-like generator must first establish that
the application of those provisions to the facts posited would be a
retroactive application. Joseph Story, as a federal judge in New
Hampshire, gave the classic definition of retroactivity: "[E]very
statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past, must be deemed retrospective." 36 Thus, a
litigant must demonstrate two things to show that Superfund's
application to the situation described above is in fact a retroactive
application. First, it must show that Superfund imposes new
duties or liabilities, which requires a thorough examination of
3 3For further discussion of this contention, see infra text accompanying notes
38-39.
3442 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980).
35 This assumption is probably accurate. For a discussion of whether a
Chemco-like generator would ultimately be held liable under the Superfund Act,
see infra text accompanying notes 172-76.
36Society for Propagating the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767
(C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156), quoted in Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519
(1884).
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prior law. Second, it must show that the Act is being applied to
"transactions or considerations already past." 37
Under the first prong of the retroactivity test, legislation that
merely duplicates a previous liability scheme does not create a new
obligation or duty; such legislation is therefore not retroactive.
Thus, Chemco must first show that it could not have been held
liable for improper dumping of its wastes under any law existing
in 1974. Under the facts described above, Chemco could probably
make this showing.38 There has been considerable commentary on
non-negligent generator liability for hazardous waste clean-up under
common law and state and old federal statutes, most of which has
concluded that a generator such as Chemco would not have been
liable in 1974.39 It is beyond the scope of this Comment to re-
survey 1974 hazardous waste law; the important point is that a
generator claiming that Superfund is impermissibly retroactive must
undertake such a survey to show the court that Superfund does not
hold it liable merely for actions for which it would have been
already liable under previously existing law.
Under the second prong of the retroactivity test, a law is not
considered to be applied retroactively unless it is applied to "trans-
37 Id.
8 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
Recently, however, state common and statutory law has become much tougher
on hazardous waste generators. For example, in 1976, New Jersey declared that
under its common law, hazardous waste generation or storage would be considered
an "ultrahazardous" activity, and those engaging in such activity would be subject
to strict and vicarious liability for any damages traceable to its wastes. Bridgeton
v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976). New Jersey, however,
is the only jurisdiction to have explicitly so declared. But several states have
recently enacted statutes holding hazardous waste generators strictly liable for
damages due to their wastes. See Cohen & Derides, Financial Responsibility for
Hazardous Waste Sites, 9 CAP. U.L. Rxv. 509, 526-44 (1980). In 1976, Congress
enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Solid Waste Disposal
Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. I 1978), which authorizes the EPA
to seek an injunction to stop the "handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal" of hazardous waste that may present an imminent and subsantial danger
to health or the environment. This Act has been used recently as the basis for
generator liability for waste clean-up. See cases cited supra note 27. See generally
Note, supra note 25, at 593-96; Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters,
and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MnqN. L. P~v. 949, 957-59 (1980).
39 See, e.g., Note, Liability for Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure
of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEo. L.J. 1047 (1981); Note, Inactive
or Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Coping with a Costly Past, 53 So.
CAL. L. REv. 1709 (1980); Note, supra note 38. Although it is arguable that
common law doctrine regarding strict liability for ultrahazardous activity may be
extended to cover hazardous waste generation, as was done in 1976 in New Jersey,
Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976), all of the
articles cited above concede that this is a very recent trend, and that past courts
have not held Chemco-like "non-negligent" generators liable under common law
or prior federal or state statutory law.
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actions or considerations already past." 40 In several hazardous
waste cases litigated under the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976 (RCRA),41 the government contended that the
Act was being applied to a hazardous condition that was currently
harming the environment, and that even though the condition
was caused by past activities of the defendant, application of
RCRA to assess liability for current clean-up of a current condi-
tion is not a retroactive application.42 In United States v. Diamond
Shamrock Corp.,43 the court agreed with this view, holding that
RCRA was not applied retroactively even though it held a de-
fendant liable for abating a present polluting condition caused by
his discharge of hazardous materials several years before the en-
actment of the statute.44 The court relied upon a line of Supreme
Court cases holding that "[a] statute is not rendered retroactive
merely because the facts or requisites upon which its subsequent
action depends, or some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent
to the enactment." 45 Similarly, in United States v. Price,4 the
court held that former dump owners who had sold their dump
before the enactment of RCRA could be held liable under that
statute without retroactive application, because the current haz-
ardous condition was caused primarily by the actions and inactions
of these defendants. 47
Unlike in the Diamond Shamrock and Price cases, however,
in which it was clear that the defendant's past actions were the
actual cause of the improper disposal and the resulting condition
to which RCRA was applied, in off-site cases such as the Chemco
hypothetical, a third party was the direct cause of the improper
disposal. Under 1974 law, the Chemco-like generator/defendant
was not connected in any factual or legal way to the improper dis-
posal resulting from the third party's actions. In the RCRA cases,
the defendants would have been considered the cause of the im-
proper disposal under then-existing common law causation prin-
ciples; RCRA's application did not change the status of their
actions. By contrast, under 1974 law, Chemco would not have
40 22 F. Cas. at 767.
4142 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4 2 See, e.g., United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 12 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENv=. L. INsT.) 20,819 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp.
1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
4312 EN V . L. REP. (ENTv_. L. INsT.) 20819 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
44 Id-
4Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 449 (1934) (citation omitted).
46523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
47 Id. 1070-72.
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been deemed the cause of the improper disposal. Only the appli-
cation of a new law, such as Superfund, can change the status of
Chemco's 1974 actions to impute a causal connection to the im-
proper disposal. A law so applied does more than "relate to or
draw upon antecedent events"; -1 it attaches a completely new
legal significance to those events, and therefore is considered a
retroactive law. As the Supreme Court has stated, an act is retro-
active in its application if it "assign[s] . . . a quality or effect to
acts or conduct which they did not have or did not contemplate
when they were performed." 49 Because the application of Super-
fund assigns a new causal quality to Chemco's 1974 actions, such
application clearly is a retroactive application.
C. Did Congress Authorize Retroactive Application of *the
Superfund Act?
Retroactive application of Superfund is necessary to hold
Chemco-like generators liable for clean-up costs; but is such an
application impermissible? Before arguing that retroactive appli-
cation of the Act is unconstitutional generators such as Chemco
might first argue that Congress did not intend to authorize retro-
active application. Courts would therefore need to examine the
statute and its legislative history carefully in light of relevant rules
of construction.
1. The Presumption Against Retroactive
Construction of Statutes
The Supreme Court has established a strong presumption
against retroactive construction of statutes, yet it is not clear ex-
actly how strong that presumption is. In United States v. Heth,50
the Court first stated that "[w]ords in a statute ought not to have
a retrospective operation, unless they are so clear, strong, and im-
perative, that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless
the intention of the legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied." r1
Later in the same opinion, the Court seemed to strengthen even
further the presumption against retroactive construction by stating
that it is not permissible unless such be the "unequivocal and in-
flexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the
legislature." 52 Although the modern Court has most recently
48Reynolds, 292 U.S. at 449.
4 9 Union Pacific R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards, 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913).
507 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399 (1806).
51 Id. 413 (emphasis added).
52 Id. (emphasis added).
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quoted the latter Heth language, 53 implying that either ambiguous
statutory language regarding retroactivity by itself or an unclear
legislative intention by itself would be enough to preclude retro-
active construction, in practice the courts have treated retroac-
tivity primarily as a question of legislative intention.54 It seems,
then, that retroactive construction is permissible if the statute
offers some support for such construction and the legislative history
overwhelmingly supports such construction. If there is ambiguity
in the statutory language, however, and any ambiguity at all in
the legislative history, then retroactive construction is not permis-
sible even if on balance it appears it was intended.
2. The Language of Superfund's Liability Provision
The language of Superfund's liability provision 5 indicates
that it applies retroactively. The critical operative terms of the
53 Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1963).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63
(1928) ("Statutes are not to be given retroactive effect . . . unless the legislative
purpose so to do plainly appears"); United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & T. Ry. Co.,
270 U.S. 1, 3 (1926) (language of statutory section, entire act, and legislative
history examined before Court reached conclusion that the act should not apply
retroactively); United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105, 106 (3d Cir. 1975)
("The question [whether a new Selective Service Act statute of limitation applies
retroactively] is one of ascertaining congressional intent"); Hiatt v. Hilliard, 180
F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1950) ("Whether a statute operates retroactively or
prospectively is [a question] of legislative intent"); Silurian Oil Co. v. Essley, 54
F.2d 43, 47 (10th Cir. 1931) ("While the rule is abundantly settled that statutes
will not be construed as operating retrospectively unless the legislative intent is
unmistakable, . . . it is after all a question of legislative intent." Statute held to
operate retroactively despite absence of explicit language to that effect); Lamb v.
Powder River Live Stock Co., 132 F. 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1904) ("The rule that
statutes are to be given a prospective, rather than a retrospective, operation, is well
recognized; but, like other rules of interpretation, it is resorted to to give effect to
the presumed and reasonably probable intention of the Legislature, when the terms
of the statute do not of themselves make the intention certain or clear .... ."
Statute held to apply retroactively based on congressional intent as revealed by
the context of its enactment, but then stricken as violative of the contract clause
of the Constitution); Segars v. Gomez, 360 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.S.C. 1972) ("Of
course, whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is a matter of
legislative intent, and all of the rules [of construction] stated above must bow to
any clear statement of legislative purpose."); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Casados,
21 F. Supp. 989, 1000 (D.N.M. 1938) (retroactivity a question of legislative intent,
which, if not otherwise expressed, will be determined from entire act and legis-
lative history; act here construed may be applied retroactively). But see In re
Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 452 F. Supp. 327, 339 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd in
part, reo'd in part, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[Iln order for a provision to
have a retrospective application, the requirement must be explicitly and unmis-
takably set forth in the statute.").
5542 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1980). The section reads as follows:
a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
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section are written in the past tense, which has been held to be
strong evidence that retroactive application was intended. 6 Sec-
tion 107(a)(2) holds liable "any person who at the time of disposal
of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of." This lan-
guage clearly reflects an intent on the part of Congress to im-
pose liability retroactively.57 Section 107(a)(3), which applies to
hazardous waste generators, holds liable for response costs "any
person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dis-
posal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances" 58 that even-
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances...
(4) . . . shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, de-
struction, or loss resulting from such release.
(Emphasis added).
56 It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that the words of
statutes should be interpreted if possible in their "ordinary everyday sense" and
that departure from a literal reading is justified only if such reading would lead
to absurd, unreasonable, or clearly unintended results. See, e.g., Malat v. Riddell,
383 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1966); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962);
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns. Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). Hence,
if Congress uses the past tense in a statute, it should read, ordinarily, as applying
to past events. In several cases Congress's use of the past tense (or present perfect
tense) in key operative terms was critical to the Court's holding that the statute
applied retroactively. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216-17
(1976) (use of present perfect tense, denoting an act that has already been com-
pleted, indicates that the Act can be applied even of the requisite events occurred
in the past); Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 527-30 (1950), discussed in
Costello v. Immigration Service, 376 U.S. 120, 123 (1964) (Eichenlaub Court "was
aided considerably in its search for the proper construction of the statute by Con-
gress' use of the past tense in the phrase 'have been or may hereafter be'").
Strictly literal interpretation does present some problems, however. In Scar-
borough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 569-71 (1977), the Court cautioned that
although Congress often skillfully chooses the tense of words in a statute, in some
cases the statute was hastily enacted and the precise choice of words may have
been unintentional, making further inquiry into congressional intent necessary. See
infra text accompanying notes 62-78 for such further inquiry into the history of
Superfund's enactment.
5742 U.S.C. §9607(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
1i d. § 9607(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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tually create a condition the government deems hazardous and
cleans up under the national contingency plan. The past tense
word "arranged" is used twice, indicating that the Act can be
applied to pre-enactment generators.
The statute provides further, although less direct, indication
that the liability provisions were meant to apply retroactively.
Section 107(f) specifically exempts generators and others from lia-
bility for damages to natural resources if "such damages and the
release of a hazardous substance from which such damages re-
sulted have occurred wholly before the enactment of this Act." 59
Section 111(d)(1) then reiterates the exclusion of liability for pre-
enactment natural resource damage by stating: "No money in the
Fund may be used . . . where the injury, destruction, or loss of
natural resources and the release of a hazardous substance from
which such damages resulted have occurred wholly before the en-
actment of this Act." 0 0 The Superfund Act clearly excludes from
its coverage pre-enactment natural resource damage; significantly,
however, there is no similar language in the statute exempting
pre-enactment generators from liability for damages other than
those to natural resources. The unambiguous statutory exemption
for pre-enactment natural resource damage contrasts sharply with
the waste-damage liability provision, creating the implication that
Superfund does apply retroactively to impose liability upon pre-
enactment generators, but only for clean-up costs for wastes, not
for natural resources damages such wastes caused.
It is easy to argue, of course, that if retroactive effect were
intended, Congress could have simply inserted a clause clearly
stating that the liability provisions were to apply to pre-enactment
waste generators. The noticeable absence of such a clause may
create enough ambiguity to require an examination of the- Act's
legislative history to determine if Congress displayed a clear in-
tention to permit retroactive construction.61
59 Id. § 9607(f).
60Id. § 9611(d) (1).
61 An additional argument can be made against retroactive application of the
liability provisions. Although § 107(a) applies to those who "arranged" for dis-
posal, it states that such parties "shall be" liable for the clean-up costs. See 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980). Normally, the use of the word "shall" connotes
prospective operation. Summers v. Skibs A/S Myken, 191 F. Supp. 929, 930 (E.D.
Pa. 1961), quoting Terracciana v. Magee, 53 N.J. Super. 557, 566, 148 A.2d 68, 74
(1959) ("As an aid in interpretation of statutes it is a cardinal rule that the word
'shall' connotes prospective operation and cannot embrace events which have
already occurred"); Weiler v. Dry Dock Say. Inst., 258 A.D. 581, 583, 17
N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (1940), aff'd 284 N.Y. 630, 29 N.E.2d 938, 19 N.Y.S.2d 145
(1940).
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3. Superfund's Legislative History Strongly Supports
Retroactive Application
The Superfund Act as finally enacted was the product of a
last-minute Senate compromise. Some of its final language was
taken from the House-passed version, 2 some from the Senate com-
mittee bill, 63 and some was conceived anew by an ad hoc committee
of Senators who fashioned the last-minute compromise 6 which
eventually became the final version. Debate on the final language
was quite limited,6 5 and because the House approved the Senate com-
promise version without change,6 6 a House-Senate conference was
not necessary and thus there is no potentially clarifying conference
report. Ascertaining "congressional intent" from such a patch-
work bill is a complex, if not impossible task. It appears, how-
ever, that Congress's intent with respect to retroactive application
of the Act never changed throughout the several stages of con-
gressional consideration. 67 Thus, congressional intent regarding
This argument, however, is not persuasive. The use of "shall be" rather than"are" simply reflects the fact that liability does not attach until a court finds a
party liable. The use of the word "arranged" indicates that although the conduct
which gives rise to liability could have occurred prior to the enactment of Super-
fund, such conduct will result in liability.
62 H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
63 S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S14,938-48 (daily ed. Nov.
24, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate committee version].
64S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. S14,840-53 (daily ed. Nov.
21, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate compromise version]. The bill's passage is
noted at 126 CONG. REc. S15,009 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
65 See 126 CONG. REc. S14,962-15,009 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980); 126 CONG.
REc. H11,786-802 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
66 126 CONG. REc. H11,802 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
67 The House committee's version of Superfund, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 8, at 2-17 [hereinafter cited as
House committee version] (liability section reprinted in 126 CONG. REc. H9459
(daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980)) was amended on the House floor on September 23,
1980. 126 CONG. REc. 9461, 9468 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). But the floor
amendments did not change the committee language with regard to the retroactivity
of the liability provisions. Compare House committee version § 3071, H.R. REP.
No. 1016, supra note 8, at 14-15, 126 CONC. BEc. at H9459, with § 3071 as
amended and passed by the House on September 23, 1980, 126 CONG. REc. at
9461, 9468 [hereinafter cited as House-passed version]. The past tense words"caused" and "contributed" are used in both versions. Hence both the House
committee report, H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 8, at 33-35, and House floor
debate on the original version, 126 CONG. tEc. at 9461-68, may be consulted.
The Senate committee version of Superfund, S. 1480, see supra note 63, was
quite different from the House versions with regard to the extent of generator
liability, but was not different in any way that would have affected its retroactivity:
All three versions used past tense words at the critical times. Compare House
committee version, supra, § 3071 with Senate committee version, supra note 63, § 4,
and with House-passed version, supra, § 3071. Finally, the "compromise bill,"
supra note 64, passed by the Senate to replace the two House versions and the
Senate committee version, used the same past tense words found in the Senate
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the Act's retroactivity can be gleaned from early committee reports
as well as from later floor debates.
The legislative history of the Superfund Act clearly indicates
that Congress intended the clean-up liability provisions to apply
retroactively. Both the House and the Senate committee reports
described, as a primary goal of Superfund, the need to remedy the
effects of inadequate past disposal practices.6 Both reports de-
scribed as targets of the legislation several inactive sites, the
clean-up of which would require retroactive application of the
Act.69
In discussing the need for new legislation, the House report
noted the failure of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 70
to address the consequences of inactive hazardous waste sites:
The [RCRA] is prospective and applies to past sites
only to the extent that they are posing an imminent
hazard ... .
It is the intent of the Committee in this legislation to
initiate and establish a comprehensive response and fi-
nancing mechanism to abate and control the vast prob-
lems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites.71
In addition, the Senate report specifically discussed the statu-
tory language that ultimately became section 107(f), which creates
an explicit exception to retroactive application of the liability
provisions with regard to damages to natural resources.72 The
committee version, indicating that there was no change regarding the retroactivity
issue, and that the Senate committee report, S. EP. No. 848, supra note 15, may
also be consulted. Because the House adopted the Senate compromise version
without change, the House and Senate debates on that version are also instructive.
See 126 CONG. REC. S14,962-15,009 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980); 126 CONG. REC.
Hl1,787-802 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). Simply stated, both the House and the
Senate used language indicating retroactive application in all versions of Superfund
considered, and it is therefore appropriate to look to all documents making up the
legislative history for elaboration on this point.
68 S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 12; H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 8,
at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N~ws at 6120.
69 S. EP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 9-10; H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 8,
at 18-20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6120-23.
7042 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
71 H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 8, at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws at 6125.
72 S. REm. No. 848, supra note 15, at 37. The report provides that
neither the liability scheme ...nor the Fund can be used to recover for
natural resource and property damages when the damages and the release
1982.]
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report made it clear that this limitation was only an exception,
stating that "[c]osts of removal (clean-up and containment) are not
affected by this provision." 73 This clearly implies that retroactive
application of the liability provisions pertaining to clean-up costs
was intended.
The very fact that several opponents of Superfund protested
the unfairness of retroactive application of the Act is an indication
that the Act was generally understood to permit such application.
Concern about the fairness of retroactive imposition of liability
was expressed at numerous times during congressional considera-
tion of the legislation-first by three Senators filing "Additional
Views" to the committee report,74 and later by several Representa-
tives on the floor of the House during its initial consideration
of the Act.7 5 During the full Senate's consideration of the legisla-
tion, several Senators, including the bill's primary sponsor, re-
marked that clean-up of inactive sites was imperative, and used as
examples waste sites which could not have their clean-up financed
by Superfund's liability provisions unless the Act was applied
retroactively.76
Although the above sketch of Superfund's legislative history
provides fairly strong evidence of Congress's intent to authorize
retroactive application of the liability provisions, at no point did
any supporter of the legislation explicitly state such an intention.
The applicable statutory construction standard does not require an
explicit statement; the legislative history need only offer strong
support for a retroactive construction. 77 In light of the accusa-
tions from Superfund opponents that retroactive application of
the liability provisions would be unfair, it is understandable that,
as a matter of strategy, the legislation's supporters would not call
attention to their desire to permit retroactive application, but
would instead claim that the Act does little more than codify pre-
of hazardous substances causing such damages occurred prior to enactment
of [the Act). This provision allows for recovery only of prospective
natural resource and property damages.
73 Id.
741d. 119-22 (views of Ses. Domenici, Bentsen, and Baker).
75 126 CoNG. BEc. H9446-48; 9465-68 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
76 See, e.g., 126 CoNG. Rc. S14,963 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of
Sen. Randolph, primary Senate sponsor) (procedures are needed to deal with past
disposal of chemical wastes; numerous abandoned sites listed); id. S14,969 (remarks
of Sen. Moynihan) (Superfund needed to clean up Love Canal, a disaster caused
by 30 years of improper disposal); id. S14,971 (remarks of Sen. Bradley) (ap-
proximately 235 abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites in New Jersey alone
would finally be cleaned up under Superfund).
7 7 See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
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existing common law principles governing past disposal pro-
cedures.78
4. Conclusion: The Act Permits Retroactive Application
The courts interpreting Superfund should hold that the lan-
guage of the liability provisions, read in light of the legislative
history, shows sufficient congressional intent to permit retroactive
application under even the stringent standard applicable. Chemco
or similar generators claiming that the statute should not be con-
strued as permitting retroactive application could succeed only by
convincing a court to apply an even stronger presumption against
retroactive construction than that which has been described.
One line of Supreme Court cases has held that a construction
that raises a serious constitutional difficulty should be avoided in
favor of a feasible alternative construction that does not.7 9 Thus,
if Chemco can demonstrate that retroactive application of Super-
fund to its 1974 activities raises a serious question of constitution-
ality, a court might hold that the minor ambiguities in the statu-
tory language preclude retroactive application as a matter of
statutory construction. For example, in 1977 the New Jersey
Superior Court held that because of possible constitutional dif-
ficulties, the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act8 o
should not be construed as applying retroactively to formerly
innocent parties.81
Alternatively, Chemco might try to convince a court that even
if it determines that Congress intended to authorize retroactive
construction, the liability provisions should be stricken on consti-
tutional grounds.
Both of these arguments depend upon the strength of thd
claim that retroactive application of Superfund is unconstitutional.
78 Representative Gore made this claim, arguing that if common law strict
liability doctrines had been properly applied, past generators would have been
strictly and vicariously liable for all damages resulting from their wastes. See 126
CoNG. REc. H9462 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). Also, in a letter to the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, Douglas M. Costle, then the Ad-'
ministrator of the E.P.A., claimed that Superfund did nothing more than expand
slightly on existing common law. The committee report included Costle's letter as
a supplement. See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 97-100.
79 See, e.g., Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 351-52 (1937); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); In re Moneys Deposited, Etc., 243 F.2d 443;
448 (3d Cir. 1957). See also cases cited in United States v. Lindsay, 346 U.S.
568, 571 n.2 (1954) (statutes construed to avoid- inequitable and unfair results of
retroactive application).
so N.J. STAT. Atr. 58:10-23.11 (West 1982).
81 State Dept. of EnvtL. Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376
A.2d 1339 (1977).
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D. Is Retroactive Application of Superfund Unconstitutional?
Far from raising constitutional questions serious enough to
preclude retroactive construction of the Superfund Act or to in-
validate the liability provisions, the statute is well within due
process 82 and other constitutional boundaries.83
1. Superfund is not an Ex Post Facto Law
It should be clear that the Constitution's explicit prohibition
against ex post facto lawmaking 84 applies only to criminal laws
that inflict punishment.88 Superfund's liability provisions contain
no criminal penalties; pre-enactment violators are not even sub-
ject to civil penalties if they cooperate with government clean-up
efforts 836-they are merely required to reimburse the government
for the cost of waste site clean-up.
8 7
As the Chemical Manufacturers' Association suggested in pre-
Superfund hearings,88 however, generators such as Chemco might
argue nonetheless that imposition of what may be heavy costs
through joint and several liability 89 is in effect punishment of a
formerly innocent generator. 90 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co.91 indicates that the Supreme Court would hesitate to approve
the retroactive imposition of liability on any theory of "blame-
worthiness." 92 Pointing to the language in the legislative history
condemning the chemical industry, Chemco could argue that Con-
gress intended to "blame" past hazardous waste generators for
82 See infra text accompanying notes 94-107.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 84-93.
s4 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
s5 United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.13
(1977).
86 If they fail to cooperate with government clean-up efforts, they may be
subject to civil penalties under 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
87 See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
88 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
89 See infra text accompanying notes 180-240 for an assessment of when joint
and several liability is in fact appropriate under the Act.
90 The Supreme Court has held that penalties that are not technically criminal
may nevertheless be classified as such in certain circumstances. In Burgess v.
Salmon the Court held that a statute permitting collection of past tax penalties that
the government had failed to collect was an ex post facto law, stating that "the ex
post facto effect of a law cannot be evaded by giving a civil form to that which
is essentially criminal." 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878) (citations omitted). In Lehman
v. Carson, Justice Black argued in a concurring opinion that a retroactive law re-
quiring deportation of aliens for past offenses inflicted a punishment and was in fact
an ex post facto law. 353 U.S. 685, 690-91 (1957) (Black, J., concurring).
91428 U.S. 1 (1976).
92 1d. 17-18 (citations omitted).
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present problems. This argument, however, is quite tenuous. The
imposition of clean-up liability on past chemical waste generators,
without any accompanying penalties for bad behavior, is based
on the types of policies animating strict tort liability,
9 3 not on
any theory of blameworthiness.
In sum, the argument characterizing Superfund's liability
provisions as ex post facto lawmaking should not succeed.
2. Retroactive Application of Superfund Does Not
Violate Due Process
Unlike ex post facto criminal legislation, retroactive civil
legislation is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. It is
well established that mere retroactive application does not fender
a civil statute unconstitutional.94 Such a law is not invalid unless
it violates a constitutional provision such as the due process clause,
the equal protection clause, or the clause forbidding impairment
of contractual obligations. 95 Of these, the only viable argument
for a generator such as Ghemco is that retroactive imposition of
liability is a violation of the due process clause. This contention,
however, is without real merit.
Chemco would argue that it is unfair to impose an unex-
pected and substantial cost on chemical companies that were not
negligent under prior law, having complied with prior law in good
faith. It could stress that it had relied on 1974 laws and require-
ments in making waste disposal plans, and had structured its in-
surance coverage based on potential liability under prior law.
Chemco would contend that Superfund's imposition of liability
for these actions is so unfair that it violates substantive due process
requirements.
This argument lacks precedential support; no federal court
has ever issued such a holding. In fact, the only decision offering
any support for such a contention is State Department of Environ-
mental Protection v. Exxon Corp.,96 in which a New Jersey court
held that constitutional difficulties precluded retroactive applica-
93 See 126 CONG. BEc. H9463 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Core) (liability provisions patterned after common law strict liability for ultra-
hazardous activity); S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 13 (strict liability is founda-
tion of S. 1480).
94 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 554 (1949); Blount v.
Windley, 95 U.S. 173, 180 (1877).
95 The contract clause argument is, however, often subsumed in the due process
argument. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 959
(7th Cir. 1979).
96151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977).
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tion of the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act 97 be-
cause such an application would "place the enormous burden of
abating a condition created by a third party on the shoulders of
a party innocent of any wrongdoing." 98 The only support offered
by any federal body consists of comments made by Congressmen
during consideration of the Superfund Act, 9 including the sug-
gestion made by three Senators filing "Additional Views" to the
Senate committee report that retroactive application of the Act
would not be "consistent with American Standards or [sic] juris-
prudence" and "may be unconstitutional." 100
Until relatively recently, the Supreme Court had not formu-
lated any explicit tests to aid in the determination whether retro-
active application of a law was reasonable or fair under the due
process clause, but several commentators have summarized the fac-
tors that the Court seems to have considered. 101 The Court has
usually weighed the nature and strength of the public interest
served by the statute and the method used to further that interest
against the extent to which the new law has modified prior rights
and duties, the nature of the rights and duties affected, and the
extent to which the parties involved relied upon prior law.102
The Court's recent decision in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Min-
ing Co., 03 however, contains a direct and explicit consideration of
the claim that retroactive application of a law violates the due
process clause. In Turner Elkhorn Mining, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a black lung benefit statute which imposed
liability retroactively upon mine operators whose former employ-
ees had been disabled by black lung disease well before the enact-
ment of the statute. The Court there held: "[O]ur cases are
clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful
solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations . . . . This
97 N.J. STAT. ANN. 58:10-23.11 (West 1982).
98 151 NJ. Super. at 482, 376 A.2d at 1348. Of course, dictum from a New
Jersey court construing a New Jersey statute under New Jersey statutory construction
principles is of little, if any, precedential value to a generator trying to prove that
a federal law is unconstitutional.
99 See supra notes 29-31.
100 S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 120 (views of Senators Domenici,
Bentsen, and Baker).
101 See, e.g., Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retro-
active Legislation, 73 H4Av. L. REv. 692 (1960); Slawson, Constitutional and
Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALiF. L. REv. 216
(1960); see also Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51
Nw. U.L. REv. 540 (1956).
' 0 2 Hochman, supra note 101, at 697.
103 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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is true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new
duty or liability based on past acts." 104 A constitutional attack
on retroactive legislation based on the due process clause, like all
substantive due process claims in the economic field, imposes a
heavy burden on the one complaining of the violation:
It is by now well established that legislative Acts
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come
to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality,
and that the burden is on one complaining of a due
process violation to establish that the legislature has acted
in an arbitrary and irrational way.10 5
A Chemco-like generator faces difficulty in showing that the
Superfund Act's liability provisions are an "arbitrary and irra-
tional" way of approaching the hazardous waste problem. The
mine operators in Turner Elkhorn Mining argued that the Black
Lung Act spread costs in an "arbitrary and irrational" manner
because it imposed proportionally heavier costs on operators whose
former employees had contracted black lung disease, instead of
simply taxing all coal miners presently in business based on their
present employment patterns. They noted that an operator whose
work force had declined would incur a liability that was dispro-
portionately high compared to the present size of his operation,
and argued that such imposition of liability for past events would
give a competitive advantage to new entrants into the industry,
while competitive factors would prevent the older companies from
passing on to the consumer the costs of their newly imposed lia-
bility.06 Chemco could make a similar contention, arguing that
a third party's negligence should not result in disproportionate
liability on past generators who had obeyed all prior disposal laws,
and that such retrospective imposition of liability will make such
generators less competitive today despite the fact that they always
used legal disposal procedures, and may now be using the safest
possible disposal methods.
The Supreme Court rejected this line of argument in the
Turner Elkhorn Mining case, stating that
104 Id. 16 (citations omitted).
105 Id. 15 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)) (emphasis added).
See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). See also Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 630 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1980) (retroactive ap-
plication of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act passes rationality test).
106 428 U.S. at 18.
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it is for Congress to choose between imposing the burden
. . . on all operators . . . or . . . [imposing] that liability
solely on those early operators .... We are unwilling to
assess the wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme by examin-
ing the degree to which ... retrospective liability imposed
on the early operators can now be passed on to the con-
sumer. It is enough to say that the Act approaches the
problem of cost spreading rationally; whether a broader
cost-spreading scheme would have been wiser or more
practical under the circumstances is not a question of con-
stitutional dimension.10 7
It seems clear that the cost-spreading scheme imposed by Super-
fund meets this minimum rationality standard, especially because
the concepts underlying generator liability are quite similar to
well-accepted strict liability tort principles. In fact, imposing lia-
bility for dumpsite clean-up on past waste generators, who have
at least a common-sense connection-if not a previously recognized
legal connection-to the problem, may be more rational than hold-
ing all chemical companies or the general public responsible for
clean-up through an across-the-board tax scheme: such parties may
have no connection whatsoever to the condition.
Given the minimum rationality test the Court has now articu-
lated for due process attacks on retroactive legislation, a Chemco-
like constitutional claim is without merit, and Superfund's lia-
bility provisions, as has been demonstrated, therefore may be
applied retroactively.
III. THE SCOPE AND MEANING OF SUPERFUND'S THRD-PARTY
"DUE CARE" DEFENSE TO LIABILITY
A. Liability of Pre-enactment Generators
Although Superfund's liability provisions constitutionally may
be applied to past hazardous waste generators, the precise standard
of liability imposed by the Act is not readily apparent. The Act
holds past waste generators "liable" for clean-up costs,' 08 but pro-
vides several statutory defenses to liability, the most significant
being a "due care" defense open to generators who can establish
that certain third parties improperly disposed of their wastes. 109
107 Id. 18-19.
108 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
109Id. §9607(b)(3). The other two statutory defenses are that the release
was caused solely by an act of God or an act of war. Section 9607(b), which con-
tains all of the Acts statutory defenses, reads as follows:
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At least two sources of confusion obfuscate the intended meaning
of the liability scheme 110 established by the Act; both result from
final language that was the product of a last-minute compromise
involving poorly drafted and poorly explained changes in the lia-
bility and statutory defense sections."' The first problem is Con-
gress's meaning in using the word "liable" in the final version;
earlier versions had held generators and others "strictly liable."
The second difficulty lies in determining when Congress intended
the third party "due care" defense to be available, and in ascertain-
ing what behavior constitutes "due care."
This Comment asserts that Superfund imposes "strict liability"
upon all defendants unless they can utilize one of the statutory
defenses provided. Further, it argues that the "due care" defense
should be available to all past (pre-enactment) generators who can
show that their wastes were improperly disposed of by a third party,
even if that party was contractually related to the generator. That
defense, however, should not be available to future (post-enactment)
generators unless they can establish that the third party who caused
the improper release was wholly unrelated. Finally, this section
(b) There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section
for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee
or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs
in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly with the defendant (except where the sole contractual
arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage
by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration
the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant
facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foresee-
able acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences
that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
11oThe "liability scheme" includes the underlying liability standard set by
§ 9607(a) and the statutory defenses established by § 9607(b). Obviously, the two
sections are interrelated closely.
Il See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. Several representatives com-
plained about the limited time the House had to consider the Senate-passed
compromise bill, noting that there were several ambiguities in the final language
that needed further refinement. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. H11,790-91 (daily ed.
Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Reps. Broyhill and Harsha); id. H11,795 (remarks of
Rep. Biaggi). Nevertheless, the House passed the Senate compromise bill without
change, eliminating the need for a potentially clarifying conference report. Id.
H11,803.
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offers illustrations of behavior that should allow a generator to suc-
cessfully invoke the "due care" defense.
B. The Legislative History of the Liability Provisions
Because the Superfund Act does not require the promulgation
of any regulations to clarify the liability provisions, 112 and because
the courts have not yet provided an exhaustive interpretive hold-
ing, the statute and accompanying legislative history furnish the
only meaningful sources for exposition. During this examination,
it is critical to trace the changes that occurred in the liability lan-
guage as the Act made its way through the congressional maze. An
examination of those changes and the probable reasons for them
sheds some light on the nature and meaning of the final compro-
mise agreement which became the Act.
Four versions of Superfund must be analyzed to understand
properly the meaning of the final version: (1) the House bill as
reported by the House Commitee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce; 113 (2) the bill that initially passed the House; 114 (3) the
Senate bill as reported by the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works," 5 and (4) the Senate compromise bill,116 which
was eventually adopted by both the Senate and the House and
became the Act. Of the four versions, the House committee bill
contained the weakest liability provisions, and the Senate com-
mittee bill contained the strongest. A court attempting to discern
where the final version should be placed on the liability spectrum
should begin by analyzing the House committee bill.
1. The House Committee Bill
Although the House committee bill as reported used the term
"strictly liable" in its liability provision," 7 it did not in fact hold
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980).
"1 H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in H.R. El'P. No. 1016, supra
note 8, at 2-17 [hereinafter cited as the House committee bill].
"4 H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H9479 (daily ed. Sept.
23, 1980) [hereinafter cited as the House-passed bill]. The full text of the House-
passed bill was not reprinted in the Record.
15 S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S14,938-48 (daily ed. Nov.
24, 1980 [hereinafter cited as the Senate committee bill].
"16 H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. BEc. S14,988-15,002, 15009
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) [hereinafter cited as the Senate compromise bill]. The
Senate compromise passed the House unchanged, 126 CONG. BEe. II1,803 (daily
ed. Dec. 3, 1980), and thus became the Act. Because all revenue raising bills
must originate in the House, the Senate was required to retain the House bill
number, but it struck all of the House-passed language after the enacting clause
and substituted the Senate compromise language.
"7 House committee bill, supra note 113, §3071(a) (1), 126 CONG. Eec. at
H-9459.
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all hazardous waste generators, especially those who contracted out
their disposal operations, strictly liable for damages caused by their
wastes. First, the bill imposed liability only on defendants who
"caused or contributed" to an improper xelease or threatened re-
lease of hazardous materials." 8 As the committee report clearly
states, "the mere act of generation . . . of hazardous waste, or the
mere existence of a generator's or transporter's waste in a site with
respect to which cleanup costs are incurred would not, in and of
itself, result in liability under section 3071." 119 This would not
be the case if a strict liability standard were intended, and the
committee further stated that "the usual common law principles
of causation, including those of proximate causation, should gov-
ern the determination of whether a defendant 'caused or con-
tributed' to a release or threatened release." 120 Second, the House
committee's third party "due care" defense was so broad as to be
available to all generators who had contracted out their waste dis-
posal, 121 a fact lamented by several representatives favoring strict
and vicarious liability.122 The net effect was a bill that held past
and future generators such as Chemco, who contracted for disposal
with a third party, only to. a "due care" standard.
2. The House-passed Version (Gore Amendments)
When the committee bill's liability provisions reached the
House floor, they were criticized as falling far short of strict lia-
bility.2 3 A "compromise amendment," described as a middle
ground between strict liability and the negligence-like "due care"
standard imposed by the House committee bill, was offered by Rep-
resentative Albert Gore, Jr.124 The Gore Amendment did not
change the requirement that the defendant must have "caused or
contributed" to a release to be held "strictly liable" for clean-up
costs, 125 so, as Representative Madigan made clear,126 the com-
118 Id.
"39 H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 8, at 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws at 6136.
120 Id. at 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 6136.
121 House committee bill, supra note 113, § 3071(a) (1) (C), 126 CoNG. REC.
at H9459.
122 See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. H9462-63 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Core); id. H9468 (remarks of Rep. Jeffords).
123 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
124 126 CONG. Eec. H9461 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). As discussed infra note
153 and accompanying text, the Gore language was incorporated substantially into
the final bill.
125 House-passed bill, supra note 114, § 3071(a) (1).
126 See 126 CONG. EEC. H9465-66 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
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mittee bill's negligence-like proximate causation principles still
applied. The Gore Amendment did, however, limit the avail-
ability of the third party "due care" defense to instances in which
the defendant can establish that the hazardous release was caused
solely by
an act or omission of a third party other than (i) an em-
ployee or agent of the defendant, or (ii) a person whose
act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the de-
fendant.12
7
So, in contrast with the committee version, the "due care" defense
was not made available to a defendant who could establish that
any third party caused the release.
It is unclear, however, whether the Gore Amendment's limita-
tion of the third party "due care" defense was intended to apply
retroactively. A quick reading of the amendment's language seems
to indicate that the defense would not be available to past gener-
ators such as Chemco who contracted with third parties to dispose
of hazardous waste, making such generators strictly liable for re-
leases. Although there is support for such a reading, a stronger
argument can be made that the limitation was not intended to
apply retroactively to prevent past generators who contracted for
disposal from utilizing the "due care" defense. That is, the better
interpretation of the amendment is that the "due care" defense is
unavailable only when the third party involved was an employee or
agent of the defendant or a person entering into a future (post-
enactment) contractual relationship with the defendant. Given
the strong presumption against retroactive construction outlined
above,128 the use of the word "occurs" instead of the past tense
word "occurred" 129 indicates that the Gore Amendment's "con-
127 House-passed bill, supra note 114, § 3071(a) (1) (C), 126 CONG. REc. at
H9461 (emphasis added). The act of God and act of war defenses were also
retained, id. §3071(a)(1)(A), as was a later-deleted defense for releases caused
solely by government actions. Id. § 3071(a) (1) (B), 126 CONG. BEc. at 9459.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
129 As stated supra note 56, the words of a statute should ordinarily be read
literally, and the tense used is one guide to proper construction. In several cases,
courts have held that retroactive construction is not appropriate if the key terms
of the statute are in the present tense. See, e.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147,
149-50 (1st Cir. 1978) (because operative language of statute is in present tense,
application to past actors is not appropriate unless the plain meaning of the language
would produce an absurd result, which is not the case here), rev'd on other
grounds sub noa. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Reuther v. Trustees of
Trucking Emp., 575 F.2d 1074, 1077 (3d Cir. 1978) (although a fortress should
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tractual relationship" limitation on the "due care" defense applies
only prospectively to prevent future waste generators from avoiding
"strict liability" by contracting out for waste disposal. 130
The uncertainty regarding the proper interpretation of the
Gore Amendment created by the use of the present tense in the
amendment's language is exacerbated by the very ambiguous state-
ments made during the House's consideration of the amendment.
Representative Gore's own statements provide a prime example.
"Prospective only" interpretation is supported by his statements
that the purpose of the amendment was to remove "the ability of
and incentive for a defendant to contract away liability" 131 and
to insure that the principles of "both strict and vicarious liability
remain intact in cases in which a defendant seeks to shift the
responsibility for cost resulting from his ultrahazardous activity
to others with whom he is involved in a business relationship." 132
Although it might be argued that removing "the ability of . ..
a defendant to contract away liability" could refer to past (as well
as future) conduct, Representative Gore appears to be emphasizing
the desire to prevent future generators from contracting away lia-
bility: he makes no mention of his amendment's applicability to
past non-negligent generators such as Chemco. In addition, Rep-
resentative Madigan implied that the Gore Amendment retained
the defenses (including the "due care" defense) available to past
waste generators that the House committee had included to pre-
vent unfair retroactive liability.1 33
In contrast, retroactive application of the "due care" limitation
is supported by Representative Gore's statement that the purpose
not be made out of the dictionary, the plain meaning of the use of the present
tense and not the past tense indicates that section of statute applies only
prospectively).
Once again, however, the Scarborough v. United States caution is in order:
the tense of words in hastily drafted statutes may have been unintentional, making
further inquiry into congressional intent necessary. 431 U.S. at 569-71. For such
further inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 131-39, 164-67.
130 Although the liability section as a whole should be held to apply retro-
actively, see supra text accompanying notes 50-81, this Comment argues that the
Gore Amendment's limitation on the use of the statutory "due care" defense does
not apply retroactively. The same argument regarding the Act's final language is
also made. See infra text accompanying notes 164-67. Courts have held that
when Congress applies an act retrospectively in one section, the absence of a clear
statutory command that another section should apply retroactively precludes retro-
active application of the second section. See In re Surface Mining Reg. Idtig., 4529
F. Supp. 327, 339 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
13. 126 CoNe. Rec. H9463 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (emphasis added).
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 Id. H9465-66.
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of his amendments to the House committee bill was to "remove
the various escape hatches . . . that would enable the parties who
are most responsible for our hazardous waste problem to avoid
liability." 134 Here, he expresses a desire to impose strict liability
on those most responsible for the hazardous waste problem existing
at the time of the act, which would appear to include generators
who contracted out disposal in the past.135
The ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of the Gore
Amendment does not end with Gore's own statements. On one
hand, the Chemical Manufacturers' Association, which had been
adamantly opposed to retroactive strict liability for past waste
generators, publicly supported the Gore Amendment,' 36 indicating
that the "due care" standard, and not strict liability, was intended
for past waste generators. On the other hand, Representative
Jeffords indicated that the Gore Amendment's limitations on the
"due care" defense were intended to apply retroactively as well as
prospectively.137
The intended application of the Gore Amendment's limita-
tions on the "due care" defense is at best unclear. For several rea-
sons the better interpretation rejects retroactive application. Al-
though care must be taken against relying too heavily on verb tense
in hastily drafted statutes,13 8 the use of the present tense word
"occurs," together with the ambiguous and seemingly contradictory
legislative history and the strong presumption against retroactive
construction, argue against retroactive application. A statute should
not be applied retroactively when neither its language nor its legis-
lative history strongly supports such a construction. 39
The House passed the Gore Amendment by voice vote.' 40
Thus, the Superfund legislation it recommended to the Senate
held future generators who engaged in Chemco-like third party
'34 Id. H9465.
135 See supra text following note 12.
'36 A letter indicating such support was sent to Representative Florio, the prin-
cipal House sponsor, and was reprinted in the Record by him. 126 CONG. REc.
H9467 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). But see 126 CoNG. REc. S14,963 (daily ed.
Nov. 24, 1980), in which Senator Randolph stated that "I hear that industry sup-
port never really existed for the House superfund bill."
'37 126 CoNG. REc. H9468 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (the Gore Amendment
"limits the defense of intervening actions of a third party to instances where the
defendant did not have a contractual relationship with the third party .... )
(emphasis added).
138 Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. at 569-71.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
140 126 CONG. Eec. H9468 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
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disposal procedures strictly liable (subject to the causation require-
ment) for clean-up costs, but would have subjected past generators
who contracted out their waste disposal to a lower "due care"
standard.
It should be noted that adoption of the "prospective only"
interpretation of the Gore language (as incorporated into the final
version) would not permit all generators who contracted out their,
waste disposal prior to the enactment of Superfund to escape lia-
bility. In fact, because such generators would still have to meet
the "due care" standard of section 9607(b)(3), it is likely that most
would still be held liable. To satisfy the "due care" standard,
generators must establish that they took reasonable precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of the contractor.'4' Thus,
although the Gore Amendment permits past generators to utilize
the "due care" defense, only those generators who carefully hired a
contractor and monitored the waste disposal would be able to avoid
liability under Superfund. Those generators who did not exercise.
such due care in contracting out waste disposal. would still be
held liable.
3. The Senate Committee Version
The House-passed bill sharply contrasted with the Senate com-
mittee version of Superfund. The Senate committee version
would have held all hazardous waste generators-past, present, and
future-strictly liable not only for clean-up costs, but for victim
compensation as well, 142 and it contained no proximate causation
requirement and no third party defense at all.143 The tough Sen-
ate committee bill, however, was bound for almost certain defeat
on the Senate floor, as a filibuster was threatened unless drastic
changes were made to accommodate the demands of certain con-
servative Senators who wanted the liability provisions pared
down. 44
3-41 See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
142 Senate committee bill, supra note 115, § 4(a)(1)-(2), (c), 126 CONG. EC.
at S14,940 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
143 Instead, the Senate committee bill specified which parties 'could be held
jointly, severally, and strictly liable without exception. Senate committee bill,
supra note 115, § 4(a)(i)-(iv), 126 CoNG. REc. S14,940 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
144 Senator Helms threatened to filibuster the Superfund bill. See "Superfund
Cleanup Proposal Apparently Dead This Year," 38 CONG. Q. WEuMLY REp. 3378
(Nov. 15, 1980); "Superfund Action Slated; Bill Was Pulled on Nov. 20 Following
GOP Objections," 38 CONG. Q. WEEmx REP. 3413 (Nov. 22, 1980). Senator
Helms also attempted to block Senator Byrd's motion to bring the bill up before
the full Senate. Id.
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4. The Senate Compromise Version
Senate committee members, anxious to pass a Superfund bill
before the close of the 96th Congress, responded to the concerns of
filibuster-threatening Senators by negotiating with them to produce
a compromise version acceptable to everyone.'x  The Senate
compromise bill, which was negotiated behind the scenes and de-
bated on the Senate floor for only a few hours, was passed by the
Senate' 46 and later, in identical form, by the House just before
the close of the 96th Congress. 47
As stated earlier,148 the Senate compromise, which eventually
became the Act, eliminated the term "strictly" from the liability
provision. At least one commentator has concluded that this
creates ambiguity regarding the Senate's intention to impose strict
liability in any circumstances.' 49 The final version, however, also
eliminated the House-passed version's proximate causation require-
ment by specifically naming the classes of individuals who could
be held liable under the bill'6 01 instead of stipulating that only
parties who had "caused or contributed" to a release may be
liable.'6 1 All toxic waste generators who arranged for disposal
by a third party clearly are covered by the final liability lan-
guage,6 2 subject to specific statutory defenses, regardless of whether
they "caused or contributed" to a release. The compromise bill
abandoned the stringent strict and vicarious liability approach of
the Senate committee bill, and adopted a third party "due care"
defense that was identical to the House-passed Gore Amendment
145 See "Compromise Reached on 'Superfund' Bill," 38 CONG. Q. WnEnrY REP.
3435-37 (Nov. 29, 1980). Among the Senators involved in the compromise
negotiations were Senators Byrd of West Virginia, Baker, Randolph, Stafford
(Randolph and Stafford were the principal sponsors), Bradley, Moynihan, Helms,
McClure, Domenici, and Dole. See 126 CoNG. REc. S14,948 (daily ed. Nov. 24,
1980) (remarks of Sens. Byrd and Baker).
146 126 CONG. REc. S15,009 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
'47 126 CONG. REc. H11,803 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
148 See supra text following note 111.
149 Note, Liability for Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing
Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEo. L. REV. 1047, 1057 (1981).
150 Senate compromise bill, supra note 116, § 107(a) (1)-(4), 126 CONG. REC.
at S14,993. This language was taken from the Senate committee version of S. 1480.
See supra note 143.
151 The "caused or contributed" language, it should be recalled, was used in
the House-passed version. See House-passed bill, supra note 114, § 3071(a) (1).
152 Senate compromise bill, supra note 116, § 107(a) (3), 126 CONG. REc. at
S14,993.
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except for one very minor change and a more specific definition
of the behavior comprising "due care." 153
C. The Third Party "Due Care" Defense: Congress's
Intended Meaning
Given the preceding sketch of the Act's legislative history,
it is possible to ascertain the intended meaning of the final ver-
sion of the liability provisions and statutory defenses. First, al-
though the term "strict liability" was eliminated from the final
bill, it seems that this was a "concession" which gave up almost
nothing. The definitional section of Superfund10 4 provides that
the term "liable" shall be construed to be the standard of liability
that obtains under section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA).15 5 Indeed, one court has stated that "[t]he
legislative history clearly establishes Congress' understanding that
it was incorporating a standard of strict liability into [Super-
fund]." "I" As acknowledged by both of the principal sponsors of
the Senate compromise measure,157 by Senator Helms, the chief
Senate opposition spokesman, 58 and by the floor manager of the
measure during final House consideration, 15 9 section 311 of the
FWPCA has been interpreted by the courts as imposing strict lia-
bility unless the defendant can meet one of the specific statutory
defenses under that Act.160 It was also agreed that the only de-
'5 3 Senate compromise bill, supra note 116, § 107(b) (3), 126 CONG. REc. at
S14,993. The text of this section, which was identical to the final version which
became 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), is reprinted supra note 109. Besides further
elaborating on the meaning of "due care," the only change made from the House-
passed bill, which included the Gore Amendment, was to make available the "due
care" defense to defendants only if the third party intervening was a common car-
rier by rail, the contractual relationship between that party and the defendant
having arisen from a published tariff and acceptance by the rail carrier.
15442 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. IV 1980).
a15533 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1976).
156 City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
157126 CONG. REc. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen.
Randolph); id. S15,008 (remarks of Sen. Stafford).
:158 d. S15,004 (remarks of Sen. Helms).
'59 126 CoNG. Mac. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio).
26 0 See 126 CONG. BEC. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen.
Randolph) (§ 311 understood to impose strict liability); 126 CONG. REc. H11,787
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio) (§ 311 imposes strict liability
qualified only by the specific defenses stated in that Act; those defenses replaced
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fenses to Superfund liability would be the specific statutory de-
fenses provided by the Superfund Act.'61 Hence, the absence of
the word "strict" in Superfund's final liability provision does not
mean that the defendant can escape liability by pleading absence
of negligence or any other common law defense to liability-he
can escape liability only by utilizing one of the specific statutory
defenses.
The third party "due care" defense adopted by the Senate
and retained in the final bill thus takes on added significance. Be-
cause the defendant can no longer plead simple lack of causal
connection to the discharge, as he could under the House-passed
version, 162 the defendant may avoid strict liability if his wastes are
found in a site only by establishing that the release was caused
solely by the type of third party described in the "due care" de-
fense, 163 and that "due care" was exercised in arranging for disposal.
The focus of future litigation involving past and future generators
who did not dispose of their wastes themselves should thus be upon
whether they can utilize the third party defense. If they cannot,
they will be strictly liable for clean-up costs associated with their
wastes. If they can assert the defense, the analysis will shift to
whether they exercised "due care" as envisioned by the Act.
As stated above, the final compromise version's third party
defense was almost identical to the version that was adopted earlier
by the House 164 in that it permits a "due care" defense only for
a defendant who can demonstrate that the release of hazardous
waste was caused solely by "an act or omission of a third party
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual re-
lationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defend-
ant. .... " 165 Nothing was said in either the House or Senate
indicating an intent to attach a meaning to this language different
here by specific Superfund defenses to strict liability); id. H11,788 (letter from
Mr. Alan Parker of the Justice Department reprinted as part of Rep. Florio's re-
marks) (§ 311 has been interpreted by the courts as imposing strict liability; cases
cited).
161 See supra sources cited note 160.
162 House-passed bill, supra note 114, § 3071(a) (1).
163 Also, the act of God and act of war defenses were retained. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
164 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
165 Senate compromise bill, supra note 116, §107(b)(3), 126 CONG. REC.
at S14,993 (emphasis added).
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from that which it had when it originally passed the House as the
Gore Amendment. 166 Given the strong presumption against retro-
active construction of statutes, 67 the retention of the "prospective
only" House language, together with Congress's subsequent silence
indicates congressional intent to adopt the House's original "pros-
pective only" intention. The present tense word "occurs" was
used again in reference to the contractual relationship exception
to the availability of the defense, so the inference again is that the
exception is applicable only to future (post-enactment) generators,
and that pre-enactment generators who contractually arranged for
third party disposal may still utilize the "due care" defense.
There is, however, one further source of confusion regarding
the scope of the third party "due care" defense. As has been
argued, future waste generators may not utilize the defense if they
were in a "direct or indirect" contractual relationship with the
third party who caused the improper disposal. The bare language
of the statute does .not indicate what is meant by "indirect" con-
tractual relationship. The only explanation of this phrase offered
during its consideration is found in Representative Gore's remark
that the third party "due care" defense should not be available
if the party who caused the improper disposal was in a "business
relationship" with the defendant. 68 It seems clear that a sub-
-contractor, even if not contractually related to the defendant/
generator, but instead to the party the defendant hired to dispose
of his wastes, is still in a "business relationship" with the defendant
even though not technically in a "contractual relationship." Gore's
remarks imply that an expansive reading of the phrase "direct or
indirect contractual relationship" was intended.
The final problem, then, is to determine what behavior con-
stitutes "due care." The House-passed Gore Amendment retained
the statutory definition of "due care" contained in the House com-
mittee bill, so the House committee report's description of "due
care" is instructive.169 The Senate compromise bill, which became
1' 6 In fact, Representative Gore, the author of the House-passed version's
liability language, indicated that the Senate compromise bill was "essentially the
House bill." 126 CONG. REc. H11,801 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
167 See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
168 126 CoNG. lMc. H9463 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
169 See H.R. REPn. No. 1016, supra note 8 at 34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & Ai. NEws at 6137, where the committee states:
With respect to the third party defense, a defendant is also required
to establish that he exercise [sic] due care with respect to the hazardous
19821
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the final version, added further statutory elaboration to the "due
care" definition, but it seems that it simply incorporated directly
into the statute the criteria set forth in the House committee re-
port. Under the final version, a defendant who has demonstrated
that a qualified 170 third party was the sole cause of the release
must also establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the char-
acteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all rel-
evant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third
party and the consequences that could foreseeably result
from such acts or omissions.
171
Absolutely nothing offering further clarification was said in the
debates over this final language, but several hypothetical cases
may better illustrate the meaning and applicability of the "due
care" defense.
D. Illustrative Hypothetical Cases
First, assume the facts of the Chemco hypothetical exactly as
posited above.'72 If Chemco cannot utilize the "due care" defense,
waste concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such
waste. The defendant must show that he exercised due care with respect
to all reasonably foreseeable acts or omissions of a third party. For
instance, in the case of a defendant generator, shipper, transporter, or
disposer, the defendant must demonstrate that he exercised due care in
the selection and instruction of a responsible contractor or other inde-
pendent party engaged by such defendant or [sic] the transportation,
storage, treatment, or disposal of the waste, provided adequate information
as to the identity, quantity, composition, condition and characteristics of
the waste to such person, and took reasonbale measures to assure or verify
that such person properly carried out the activities for which he was
engaged. Such defendant must also demonstrate that he properly
labeled, loaded, and packaged the waste and properly equipped and
maintained the container or facility used for the transportation, storage,
treatment, or disposal of the waste. In general, the Committee intends
that for a defendant to establish that he exercised due care, the defendant
must demonstrate that he took all precautions with respect to the par-
ticular waste that a similarly situated reasonable and prudent person would
have taken in light of all relevant facts and circumstances.
170 "Qualified," as used here, means a third party of the type not excluded by
the statute.
17 Senate compromise bill, supra note 116, § 107(b) (3), 126 CONG. REc. at
S14,993. Compare the Act at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
17 2 See supra text following note 32.
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it will be held strictly liable for clean-up costs caused by its wastes.
In order to assert the defense, Chemco and all defendants must
first show that the release of hazardous substances was caused
solely by the actions or omissions of a third party. Since Chemco
knew nothing about and had no connection with Flybynighes
actions, it meets this initial test. Because the contractual relation-
ship (if any) 178 between Chemco and the third party which caused
the release occurred prior to the enactment of Superfund, Chemco
is not barred from asserting the "due care" defense by the "con-
tractual relationship" exception, and thus may embark upon an at-
tempt to prove it exercised "due care." Although Chemco's in-
volvement in the 1974 disposal of Stickychem would not have been
considered negligent behavior under 1974 law, 74 it does not appear
that Chemco can satisfy the tougher "due care" standard estab:
lished by Superfund: Although Chemco chose a reliable contractor
to conduct the disposal operation, and although the disposal con-
tract contained a clause requiring safe disposal, Chemco took no
further steps to ensure that its wastes ultimately would be dis-
posed of safely. 75 A reasonable, cautious generator could be ex-
pected to make at least an attempt to find out where its wastes
were deposited, and would not disassociate itself from the disposal
procedure immediately after hiring a contractor. Hence, although
Chemco could assert the "due care" defense, it cannot meet the
retroactively imposed "due care" requitements, and so would be
responsible for clean-up costs expended.176
Had Chemco taken further precautions against unsafe disposal
by Middleman and Flybynight, such as requiring them to submit
proof that the wastes were disposed of correctly as contemplated
under the contract, then Chemco would have been free from all
liability under Superfund's "due care" defense even if the "proof"
was in fact fraudulent and the wastes were in fact disposed of
73 See infra text accompanying notes 178-79 for a discussion of whether a
contractual relationship as defined by the Act existed between Chemco and the
ultimate disposer of its wastes.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
175 Such action is required under the House committee's description of what
constitutes "due care," see supra note 169, which was incorporated into the statute
in the final version. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
176 Even though strict liability is thus not imposed on past off-site generators,
Superfund is still being applied retroactively because the "due care' standard is
tougher than the standards that existed when Chemco acted; 'it 'is not merely
duplicative of prior law.
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improperly by a contractually related third party. 7 7  Hence, the
third, party "due care" defense exonerates past generators who
contracted out their waste disposal as long as they took more pre-
cautions against foreseeable problems than did Chemco-even if
their wastes ultimately cause damage. This would not be the
result if the Act's "contractual xelationship" limitation on the third
party "due care" defense were applied retroactively, in which case
these past generators would have been strictly liable under the Act.
In contrast, a post-enactment generator who exercised "due
care" will still be liable under Superfund if the ultimate disposer
of its wastes was in a Chemco-like contractual relationship with
him. Such a future generator might argue that a far-removed
disposer such as Flybynight is not in a "direct or indirect" con-
tractual relationship with him. Clearly, however, if the generator
knew that Middleman had subcontracted, then the subcontractor
should be considered to be in an indirect contractual relationship
with the generator. If the generator did not know that the mid-
dleman had subcontracted, then the existence of an indirect con-
tractual relationship between the generator and the disposing
subcontractor is arguably absent. Representative Gore's remark
that the "contractual relationship" exception was intended to
cover instances in which the disposer is in a "business relationship"
with the generator,178 however, indicates that even an unknown
subcontractor who disposes of a generator's wastes, and so has a
"business relationship" with the generator, should be considered
to be covered by the "contractual relationship" exception. Even
if the "indirect contractual relationship" language is interpreted
more narrowly-so that it does not cover unknown subcontractors-
it seems that a generator who does not know what party ultimately
disposed of its wastes (thus failing to oversee the disposal) would
not meet the "due care" standard in any event. In order for a
future generator to utilize the third party "due care" defense,
then, the ultimate disposer's relationship with the generator must
be quite attenuated 179 and the generator must be able to show
'77 Another situation in which a pre-enactment generator might escape liability
by meeting the "due care" test is when he took all precautions against mishandling
by the third party disposer, the disposer acted reasonably, and the wastes were
disposed of in a method which at the time of disposal was thought to be perfectly
safe, but is later discovered to have been a faulty disposal method.
178 126 CONG. REc. H9463 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
179 For example, the "due care" defense might be available if the defendant/
generator can establish that the third party who was the sole cause of the release
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good. reasons for failure to ensure that the strange third party
acted properly. Congress intended to make. it impossible for fu-
ture generators to develop elaborate, multi-party disposal pro-
cedures in order to insulate themselves from strict liability under
the Superfund Act.
IV. CAN GENERATORS BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE UNDER THE SUPERFUND ACT?
A. Background: The Issue and the Problem
Perhaps the most difficult issue presented by Superfund's lia-
bility provisions is whether Congress intended to authorize im-
position of joint and several liability 180 upon generators whose
wastes comprise only a portion of the wastes at a particular dump-
site. At a typical abandoned dumpsite, there may be dozens of
varieties of toxic wastes, generated by over one hundred different
generators, not all of whom are solvent or easily locatable. In
some cases, the wastes cleaned up at a site may be clearly traceable
to a particular generator, in which case that generator will be held
liable only for damages caused by his wastes.181  Quite often, how-
ever, damages have been caused by wastes mixed from several
sources, making accurate apportionment of damages among -the
many generators quite difficult.
If Superfund's liability provisions. can be interpreted properly
as imposing joint and several liability, then generators who cannot
prove what portion of the total damages was caused by their wastes
will be liable for the entire clean-up, bill, including costs actually
caused by other unknown or insolvent generators. 82 Thus, the
government will be able to recover the full amount of its clean-up
was a vandal who broke into a dumpsite and caused damage, or an unrelated -paxty
such as a bulldozer operator at a certified site who negligently pushes against the
lining of a pit containing the generator's wastes, causing the pit to leak.
1s0 For a concise definition of joint and several liability for multiple polluters,
see RESTATEMmNT (S-coD) OF TORTS § 433B (2) comment d, illustration 7 (1965).
The modem principles of joint and several liability are also well summarized in the
remarks of Representative Gore, 126 CONG. REc. H9463-65 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1980). See also infra text accompanying.notes 182-84. -
181 For example, it may be established that damages at a particular site were
caused solely by leaking barrels, and those barrels may have been clearly labelled
so that the contents and responsible generator can be easily identified.
28 2 See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433B(2) comment d, illustration
7 (1965).
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costs, including costs actually caused by unknown or insolvent
parties, from any one of the liable generators. 83  After such re-
covery, the generators may seek to apportion the damages among
themselves, which may involve new litigation.1 4
If, however, Superfund was not intended to authorize im-
position of joint and several liability upon individual generators,
then the government will be able to recover from each generator
only that portion of the total clean-up bill which it can prove
was caused by that generator's wastes. Most importantly, the
government will not be able to recover the costs of cleaning up
wastes caused by unknown or insolvent generators. 85 If such is
the case, full recovery of government clean-up costs will be difficult,
if not impossible, in many cases.
Not surprisingly, the language of the Superfund Act is am-
biguous regarding imposition of joint and several liability. Un-
like all three earlier versions of the bill, the final version makes
no mention of joint and several liability, but merely holds gen-
erators and others "liable" for costs incurred.(' At least one
commentator has, with some justification, interpreted the deletion
of the terms "joint and several" as precluding the imposition of
joint and several liability under Superfund.8 7  Floor statements
about the final version, however, make such an interpretation open
to question, and necessitate another look at the complex legislative
history of Superfund. Unfortunately, resolving the "joint and
several liability" issue is even more difficult than ascertaining the
scope and meaning of the third party "due care" defense.
'183 Under the doctrine of "satisfaction," however, a plaintiff may recover from
only one of several jointly and severally liable defendants, unless that defendant
fails to pay in full. See remarks of Rep. Gore, supra note 180, 126 CONG. REc.
at H9453.
184 Under the doctrine of "contribution," jointly and severally liable defendants
may seek to apportion the totar damages paid among themselves after the plaintiff
has been paid in full. See id. The right of Superfund defendants to seek such
post-payment contribution from co-defendants is guaranteed by the Superfund Act
itself. 42 U.S.C. § 9 607(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
85 To recover these costs, the government may sue the owner of the dump in
which the wastes are cleaned up, or disposal outfits connected to the site. As has
been noted, however, such parties are also frequently insolvent or impossible to
locate. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
186 Compare the Act at 42 U.S.C. § 9 607(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980) with the
House committee bill, supra note 113, § 3071(a) (1), and with the House-passed
bill, supra note 114, §3071(a)(1), and with the Senate committee bill, supra
note 115 §4(a).
187 See Note, supra note 149, at 1058.
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Nevertheless, this Part argues that an interpretation of Con-
gress's meaning regarding joint and several liability is. possible:
despite changes in the final statutory language, the final version was
intended to preserve the standard set forth in the original House-
passed version, which again was drafted by Representative Gore.
Congress intended to authorize imposition of joint and several
liability in most circumstances in which the generator cannot prove
his contribution, but left the courts with some discretion to ap-
portion damages when the defendant/generator cannot do so.
B. Early Legislative History
I. Initial House Consideration of the Joint and
Several Liability Issue
As the House committee had done with regard to the strict
liability issue, its version of Superfund paid lip service to a tough
(anti-industry) stance on joint and several liability, while in fact
including provisions which required court apportionment of dam-
ages not readily attributable to one generator/defendant. 188 In
effect, then, the House committee version did not impose joint and
several liability, since either the defendants or the courts were re-
quired to establish an apportionment scheme in every case.
Representative Gore, as he had done with the "due care" de-
fense, exposed the true position of the House committee bill and
introduced an amendment on the House floor to bring the House
bill closer to imposing joint and several liability. Representative
Gore argued that under modern common law standards, in cases
in which damages are not clearly divisible among multiple defend-
ants, the burden of proving that damages are capable of appor-
tionment, and the amount attributable to each defendant, falls
on each defendant. A defendant who fails to prove responsibility
for only a limited portion of the damages is jointly and severally
liable for all damages.18 9 As argued below,100 Representative Gore
accurately characterized the modern common law rule in this area,
although he failed to mention that a much more lenient traditional
188 The House committee bill, supra note 113, appears to impose joint and sev-
eral liability in §3071(a)(1). However, the bill requires the court to apportion
all unapportioned costs "to the maximum extent practicable." Id. § 3 071(a) (2) (B).
189 126 CONG. REc. H9463-65 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
19 0 See infra text accompanying notes 217-20.
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common-law rule is still followed in many jurisdictions. 9 1 This
failure, however, is understandable in light of Mr. Gore's objective:
he wanted to strengthen the House bill as much as would be po-
litically possible. 192 So, in order to move closer to the tough
modem common-law rule without appearing to do so, he presented
the tough modem position as if it were universally followed, and
described his amendment as a compromise between the modem
common law rule and the quite lenient House committee
version.1
93
The Gore compromise amendment did not require court
apportionment of damages for defendant/generators who could
not establish their contribution, and thus abandoned the lenient
approach of the House committee. But neither did it forbid such
court apportionment and require imposition of joint and several
liability, the practice followed in modern common-law jurisdic-
tions. Instead, the Gore Amendment permitted the court, at its
discretion and in conjunction with several specific statutory guide-
lines, 94 to apportion damages in appropriate cases, but to impose
joint and several liability in all other cases where the statutory
19 1 See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
192 126 CONG. REC. H9465 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Gore)
("Although I [prefer a stronger joint and several liability provision,] I offer my
amendment in the spirit of compromise."). See also H.R. RFP. No. 1016, supra
note 8, at 64, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6141, where
Representative Gore stated his intention to offer House floor amendments designed
to toughen up the House committee joint and several liability provisions.
19 3 See 126 CONG. BEo. H9465 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Core).
1
9 4 See House-passed bill, supra note 114, § 3071(a)(3)(B), 126 CONG. REC.
at H9461. This section provides that:
the court may apportion the liability among the parties where deemed
appropriate . . . In apportioning liability . . . the court may consider
among other factors, the following:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their con-
tribution to a discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste
can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to
the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics
of such hazardous waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal,
State, or local officials to prevent any harm to the public health or
the environment.
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apportionment criteria are not met by the defendant/generator.195
The Gore compromise amendment passed the House by voice vote
on September 23, 1980.11
2. The Senate Committee Version and the Senate
Compromise Version
With regard to joint and several liability the House-passed
version (containing the Gore Amendment) was still more lenient
toward generators than the Senate committee version.- The Senate
committee version, as with the strict liability issue, was the most
stringent of the four versions. Basically, it would have codified the
tough modem common-law rule requiring imposition of joint and
several liability unless the defendant could clearly differentiate
his contribution. 197
Senate committee members interested in passage of Superfund
legislation before the close of the 96th Congress realized that the
tough committee language on joint and several liability would
not survive the filibuster-threatening attacks of several influential
Senators.198 Hence, during the formation of the Senate compro-
mise version, which eventually became the Act, the Senators agreed
to delete from the Senate bill (which was the starting point in the
compromise negotiations) the terms "jointly and severally" and
simply to hold generators and others "liable" for clean-up costs.'99
C. Interpretation of the Senate Compromise/Final Version
Regarding Joint and Several Liability
1. Conflicting Statements Made During Floor Consideration
of the Final Language
The critical question with regard to the joint and several lia-
bility issue is how far from the Senate committee position the
I9 House-passed bill, supra note 114, § 3071(a)(3)(B).
196 126 CONG. REc. H9468 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
'97 Senate Committee bill, supra note 115, § 4(a), 126 CoNG. REc. at S14,940.
For a description of this section, see S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 38-39.
398See supra notes 144-45; see also 126 CONe. REc. S14,968 (daily ed. Nov.
24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (Senate committee bill will not pass because
some Senators find its provisions too ambitious, but the compromise is weakened
enough to pass).
199 Compare Senate committee bill, supra note 115, § 4(a) with Senate com-
promise bill, supra note 116, § 107(a).
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committee members consented to move in order to achieve pas-
sage of the Act. Unfortunately, the debates following announce-
ment of the compromise do not provide a clear answer. The
chief committee spokesman, Senator Randolph, acknowledged that
the terms "joint and several'-had been deleted, and said that
issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be
governed by traditional and evolving principles of com-
mon law. An example is joint and several liability. Any
reference to these terms has been deleted, and the liability
of joint tort feasors will be determined under common or
previous statutory law [(section 311 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act)].
200
If Senator Randolph understood the common law the same way
Representative Gore did-namely, as calling for imposition of joint
and several liability-then it appears that nothing at all was given
up.201 Indeed, both Senator Randolph and the chief Republican
sponsor in the Senate, Senator Stafford, were careful to say that
only the "terms" "joint and several" had been deleted, 202 leaving
open the possibility that such liability was retained in substance.
However, Senator Randolph described the deletion of the terms
"joint and several" as a concession, 20 3 which indicates that some-
thing was in fact given up. Perhaps he understood that in some
common-law jurisdictions, joint and several liability could not be
imposed upon multiple generators,204 which would mean that the
compromise's substitution of a common-law standard for the ex-
plicit and tough committee rule would not require all jurisdictions
to impose joint and several liability under the statute-a "conces-
sion." Similarly, in discussing the many concessions made to
achieve Superfund legislation in 1980, Senator Stafford stated that
200 126 CONG. REc. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
201 Representative Gore characterized the common law as imposing joint and
several liability in all cases in which the defendant could not prove his own con-
tribution was distinct. See supra text accompanying notes 189-92. As argued infra
text accompanying notes 216-20, however, this characterization reflects only the
modern, progressive common law rule, which is followed only in some jurisdictions,
and is therefore not a complete and accurate characterization of the "common law
rule" in this area.
202126 CoNG. REc.. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen.
Randolph); id. S14,967 (remarks of Sen. Stafford).
203 126 CoNG. Razc. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
204 See infra text accompanying note 219.
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"75. percent of what we were seeking in [the Committee bill]" had
been eliminated by the compromise. 2 5 From these remarks alone,
it would appear that the Senate version was diluted through in-
clusion of common-law restraints on the imposition of joint and
several liability.
The chief opposition spokesman, Senator Helms, understood
the compromise to have gone much further in weakening the joint
and several liability provision. In fact, Senator Helms believed
that the Senate compromise version was even weaker than the
House-passed version. He clearly stated that in his view, the de-
letion of the terms "joint and several" and the use of the bare
word "liable" with reference to section 311 of the FWPCA meant
that the compromise did not impose joint and several liability.
He stated:
It is very clear from the language of the Stafford-
Randolph substitute itself, from the legislative history,
and from the liability provisions of section 311 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, that now the
Stafford-Randolph bill does not in and of itself create
joint and several liability. The Government can sue a
defendant under the bill only for those costs and damages
that it can prove were caused by the defendant's
conduct.
208
When the Senate compromise reached the House floor for
final consideration, however, Senator Helms' interpretation was
implicitly called into question by the legislation's chief House
sponsor. The remarks of Representative Florio indicate that in
his view, the Senate compromise could be interpreted as imposing
joint and several liability-which would make the Senate Com-
promise even tougher than the House-passed version containing
the Gore Amendment. 207 While Florio agreed that under the final
language joint and several liability should be governed by section
311 standards and "traditional and evolving principles of common
law,"20 he inserted in the Congressional Record two legal opin-
205 126 CONe. BEc. S14,967 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
206 Id. S15,004 (remarks of Sen. Helms) (emphasis added).
207 The Gore Amendment, it should be recalled, left the courts with the dis-
cretion not to impose joint and several liability in some circumstances. See supra
text accompanying notes 193-95.
208 126 CON. PEc. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
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ions claiming that those standards call for imposition of joint
and several liability,209 a strong indication that in Florio's view,
the compromise imposed joint and several liability.
Representative Florio also made one statement, however, which
implied that the Senate compromise, if not tougher on the joint
and several liability issue than the House-passed bill, was at least
equally as stringent. He stated that the House bill "provided for
joint and several liability, but qualified that standard with two
statutory apportionment provisions" and that the Senate com-
promise, "rather than announc[ing] the standard and then cut-
[ting] back on its applicability", simply refers to common law.210
In addition, Representative Florio remarked that Congress's
intention was to encourage the development of federal common
law on the issue of joint and several liability to discourage chem-
ical companies from dumping in the states with the most lenient
laws,2 11 such as states following the traditional common law rule.212
Florio, then, felt that the Act was intended to encourage the de-
velopment of a uniform federal rule on joint and several liability
which was at least as stringent, if not more so, than the House-
passed bill.
No Representative directly challenged Florio's assertion that
the final version, with regard to joint and several liability, was as
tough or tougher than the House-passed version. Although several
Representatives claimed that the Senate compromise was weaker
than the House-passed version in other important areas, not one
asserted that the joint and several liability provision was weaker.
Most significantly, however, several Representatives characterized
the final version as essentially the same as the original House ver-
209 Representative Florio reprinted in the Record a letter from the justice De-
partment indicating that in its view the common law imposed joint and several
liability upon generators who could not prove their contribution, and a letter from
the Coast Guard indicating that in its view section 311 of the FWPCA might au-
thorize imposition of joint and several liability in "appropriate circumstances." See
126 CoNG. REc. H11,788-89 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). Of course, these letters,
both written by potential prosecutors under Superfund, are entitled to little, if any,
weight as indications of the proper interpretation of the Act's joint and several
liability provision. Their contents are significant only because they describe the
probable views of Representative Florio.
210 Id. H11,787.
211 Id
212 Such states would not impose joint and several liability upon multiple pol-
luters. See infra text accompanying note 219.
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sion. 21 3  Among this group was Representative Gore, the author
of the original House-passed joint and several liability provision.214
2. Proper Interpretation of the Final Version
How should a court use this ambiguous legislative history in
trying to determine whether imposition of joint and several lia-
bility is appropriate in a Superfund case involving multiple waste
generators? The Senate seemed able to pass the Act only by re-
ferring definition of the joint and several liability standard to
ambiguous common-law and statutory precedent, and by failing
to challenge the view that this action could be interpreted as pre-
cluding imposition of joint and several liability. The House
seemed able to pass the Act only after its chief proponent stressed
that the final version was not as weak as it looked, and that in his
view joint and several liability still could be imposed in most
circumstances. Both Houses seemed able to agree only that the
joint and several liability issue would be resolved by reference to
section 311 and the common law.
Contrary to the conflicting claims of Senator Helms and Rep-
resentative Florio,215 however, an objective look at section 311 and
the common law does not provide one consistent answer to a court
trying to determine whether Congress intended to impose joint
and several liability. No case under section 311 imposes joint and
several liability for pollution clean-up, and the language of section
311 is ambiguous on its face. Despite Representative Gore's as-
sertion to the contrary,216 the common law in this area is in a
state of total disarray.217  Although the modern trend, which both
Representatives Gore and Florio described, is toward imposition
of joint and several liability for multiple polluters who cannot
distinguish their contribution, only a limited number of jurisdic-
tions adhere to this modern rule.218  Many jurisdictions still follow
213 See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. H11,799 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Jeffords) ("Although the Senate version does not contain the House language
on the question of joint and several liability, the intent of the House provisions will
largely be served...."); id. H11,796 (remarks of Rep. Mikuiski).
214 126 Id. H11,801 (remarks of Rep. Core) ("This is essentially the House
bill.").
215 See supra text accompanying notes 206, and 207-09.
2 1
1, See supra text accompanying notes 189-93.
217 For a discussion of state common law regarding multiple tortfeasors, see
Note, Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund,
68 VA. L. Rev. 1157, 1166-73 (1982).
2 1s8EsTAvmMN (SEcoND) OF TORTs §433B(2) comment d, illustration 7
(1965); see, e.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974)
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the old Restatement rule that holds a polluter liable only for the
portion of damages that the plaintiff (government) can prove were
caused by the defendant's wastes.219  Both Prosser and American
Jurisprudence 2d stress that there is a split in the law in this
area.220 Hence, characterizing "traditional and evolving principles
of common law" in this area as either calling for or rejecting im-
position of joint and several liability would be one-sided and
inaccurate.
Given the inadequacy of the guidelines suggested in the legis-
lative history, it is arguable that Congress simply intended to leave
entirely to the courts the question whether joint and several lia-
bility should apply under a given set of circumstances. Senator
Randolph stated that joint and several liability may have been one
issue "not resolved by this Act," 221 and one Representative claimed
that Congress had "avoided" the liability issues.22
2
There are, however, two overriding problems with the con-
tention that Congress intended simply to leave the joint and sev-
eral liability issue to the courts. First, Representative Florio
clearly stated that it was Congress's intent to encourage the develop-
ment of a uniform federal standard so that chemical manufacturers
and disposers would not seek out lenient states in which to dispose
of their wastes. 223  The split in the common law regarding joint
and several liability impedes the clearly intended congressional
(burden of proof on the defendant to show what portion of total pollution it con-
tributed; if it cannot establish its contribution, it is jointly and severally liable for
total damages); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951)
(joint and several liability where damages are indivisible); Azure v. City of Billings,
182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460 (1979); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d
337 (Tenn. 1976); Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251,
248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
2 1 9 
RSTAThMzNT OF TORTS § 881 (1939); see e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Fibreboard Prod. Inc., 116 F. Supp. 377, 378 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (California
follows rule that does not impose joint and several liability upon independent tort-
feasors); Vaugbn v. Burnette, 211 Ga. 206, 84 S.E.2d 568, 569 (1954) (court must
apportion damages among several defendants who flooded plaintiff's lot); Maas v.
Perkins, 42 Wash. 2d 38, 253 P.2d 427 (1953); O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co.,
216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 198 Miss. 530, 23
So. 2d 756, 759 (1945) (defendant whose pollution allegedly contributed to the
destruction of plaintiff's fishing resort business can only be held liable for propor-
tionate part of total damages suffered).
220W. PnossEa, HANDBOOK OF TH= LAw OF TORTS § 52 (4th ed. 1971); 61A
Am. Jur. 2D Pollution Control § 551 (1981).
22 1 See supra text accompanying note 200.
222 126 CoNG. REc. H11,801 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Brown).
223 See supra text accompanying notes 211-12.
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goal of developing a uniform federal rule if the issue is left to
individual courts. Second, the argument that Congress intended to
give no guidance to the courts on this issue ignores the fact that
several key legislators strongly felt that the word "liable" as used
in the statute did reflect a statutory answer to the joint and several
liability problem-although they disagreed as to what that answer
was.224 So it seems that Congress did not intend to leave the issue
completely to the courts. Rather, the "federal common law"
regarding generator liability22 5 is to be developed by the courts
in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress as embodied
in the final compromise version.
The Senators and Representatives commenting on the final
compromise language of the liability section generally viewed it as
less strict than the Senate committee version, which called for
strict, joint, and several liability,2 26 and more in line with the
original House-passed version which incorporated the Gore com-
promise227 on joint and several liability.228  Only Senator Helms
directly contradicted this view, 22 9 and even though Helms played
an important role in the formation of the Senate compromise,
there are compelling reasons to accord his interpretation limited
weight.230  Similarly, Representative Florio's somewhat obtuse
224 Senator Helms believed the Act precluded imposition of joint and several
liability, see supra text accompanying note 206, whereas Representative Florio in-
dicated that the Act required imposition of joint and several liability by referring to
common-law and previous statutory standards, see supra text accompanying notes
207-09.
2 25 The creation of "federal common law" involves problems beyond the scope
of this Comment. Such lav in the environmental context is considered in Note,
supra note 217, at 1173-82. A more general consideration is found in Note, The
Federal Common Law, 82 HAuv. L. REv. 1512 (1969). This Comment argues that
the "federal common law" of joint and several liability that will be developed in
Superfund cases should be informed primarily by congressional directives that,
though not explicit, nevertheless are present and can be discerned by examining
closely the history surrounding the final compromise. See infra text accompanying
notes 226-40 and following note 240.
226 See supra text accompanying note 197.
2 2 7 See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
228 Both Senators Randolph and Stafford viewed the final language as less
stringent than the original Senate committee version. See supra text accompanying
notes 203-05. Representatives Jeffords, Mikulski, Gore, and, possibly, Florio viewed
the final version as the same as the House-passed version on the joint and several
liability issue. See supra notes 210, 213 & 214 and accompanying text.
229 See supra text accompanying note 206.
230 Senator Helms was the only legislator to claim that the final language was
weaker than the House-passed version on the joint and several liability issue. But
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intimation that the final version may have been even tougher on
the joint and several liability issue than the House-passed ver-
sion 231 should not be read as the conclusive interpretation. 2 2 In-
stead, it appears that the majority of Congress believed that the
final compromise bill should be regarded as handling the joint
and several liability issue in a moderate matter similar to the
House-passed Gore compromise.
233
That the majority of those involved in the final debate
equated the final measure with the House-passed version is not
surprising, for both measures were developed as a compromise
between the same two polar positions.234 Concededly, the Senate
Helms, who ultimately voted against passage of the Act because he believed its
liability provisions were too stringent, see 126 CoNG. REc. S14,988 (daily ed. Nov.
24, 1980), had reason to exaggerate how much was given up on the joint and
several liability issue by the compromise version. He undoubtedly knew, as a
member of the Senate compromise committee, that the compromise measure, having
been accepted by the Senate leadership, see 126 CoNG. REc. S14,948 (daily ed.
Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sens. Byrd and Baker), would pass. Because he had
agreed not to filibuster, see supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text, he could
best accomplish his goal of weakening the liability provisions of an Act he knew
would pass over his objections by reading into the Record his lenient interpretation
of the meaning of the compromise agreement
In addition, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has held that the
statements of opponents of a bill are not an authoritative guide to construction.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951); cf.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 583 n.85 (1963).
231 See supra text accompanying notes 207-10.
232 First, Representative Florio made at least one remark which indicated that
even he thought the final version was essentially the same as the House-passed
Gore compromise on the joint and several liability issue. See supra text accompany-
ing note 210. Second, Representative Florio may have had a tactical reason to
exaggerate the toughness of the final version on the joint and several liability issue.
As a strong supporter of prompt passage of Superfund legislation, see 126 CONe.
IEc. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980), he undoubtedly was concerned that passage
might be stalled by Representatives who felt that the Senate compromise had
weakened the legislation in critical areas. See, e.g., 126 CONG. LEc. H11,795 (daily
ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Snyder); id. (remarks of Rep. Biaggi); id.
(remarks of Rep. Pickle). It was thus in his interest to exaggerate the strength of
the final joint and several liability provision.
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that the "remarks of a single legislator,
even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history. . . . [Such]
statement[s] must be considered with .. . the statements of other Congressmen
. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979). This caution seems
particularly applicable to Florio's statements, as he was the only legislator to view
the final compromise as conceivably imposing joint and several liability according
to the strict modern common law nile.
233 See supra note 228.
234 When the full House first faced the joint and several liability issue, Repre-
sentative Gore characterized his amendment as a compromise between the modern
common-law rule (joint and several liability) and the House committee bill (prac-
tically speaking, no joint and several liability). See supra text accompanying notes
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did not simply adopt the Gore language without change, choosing
instead to compromise through obfuscation by deleting the terms
"joint and several". But it appears that the legislation's sponsors
had compelling tactical reasons to forego adoption of the House
language.m It is thus reasonable to conclude that the best in-
terpretation of the final language is that Congress intended it to
embody the same compromise as the House-passed Gore Amend-
ment on joint and several liability.
Moreover, because the Gore Amendment permits the courts to
be flexible within certain guidelines,238 looking to the Gore lan-
guage for guidance does not involve the replacement of concededly
ambiguous final language with a rigid answer to the joint and sev-
eral liability issue. Under the Gore Amendment as passed by the
House,237 generators who can conclusively prove their contribution
are not subject to joint and several liability, but are only liable for
a discrete portion of the clean-up costs.238 Generators who cannot
conclusively segregate their contribution generally will be held
jointly and severally liable, but the court is given important discre-
tionary authority to excuse such generators from joint and several
liability if it determines that they can meet certain specifically delin-
eated criteria.239 Thus, Congress has left the courts with some, but
189-93. When the full Senate first confronted the issue, it formed a committee to
compromise between the Senate committee bill (joint and several liability) and the
position of the filibuster-threatening Senator Helms (no joint and several liability).
See supra text accompanying notes 197-99 and supra note 206.
235 Senator Helms, who was threatening a filibuster, believed that joint and
several liability was inappropriate under any circumstances, see 126 CONe. REc.
S15,004 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980), and so must have been opposed to the House-
passed Gore language. By declining to adopt the explicit Core language, the
majority of Senators and committee members favoring prompt passage could avoid
a filibuster by appeasing Senator Helms with ambiguous liability language which
Helms could publicly interpret as being quite lenient. Helm's interpretation could
then be counterbalanced by more liberal interpretations, especially in the House
(where the rules forbid a filibuster), and the final language would ultimately be
interpreted to be at least as tough regarding joint and several liability as was the
House-passed version containing the Gore Amendment. Thus, the majority of
Senators favoring prompt passage of Superfund could achieve the same joint and
several liability standard as contained in the House-passed version while avoiding a
conservative filibuster.
236 See supra note 194 and text accompanying notes 194-95.
237See 126 CoNG. REc. H9461, 9468 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
238 Such generators are excused from joint and several liability under both the
traditional and modem approaches, so their status here is not in dispute. The
traditional and modem approaches differ with regard to the treatment of generators
who cannot conclusively prove what portion of wastes resulted from their chem-
icals-but such proof is often quite difficult, especially when old, leaking sites
containing wastes from many generators are involved.
23 9 See supra note 194 and text accompanying notes 194-95.
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not complete, discretion in determining whether to hold Superfund
generators jointly and severally liable, a result which itself can be
viewed as a compromise between the two possible interpretations of
congressional intent on the issue of how much discretion should
be left to the courts.2 40 The Gore approach would encourage
federal courts inclined to follow the old common law disfavoring
joint and several liability to move toward its imposition in many
cases; the Gore approach requires imposition of joint and several
liability upon defendants who cannot prove their contribution
unless the court feels such imposition would be inappropriate
under the specific guidelines provided. Conversely, the Gore ap-
proach encourages courts inclined to follow the modern common
law rule to relax that rule at times, enabling some defendant/
generators to show that joint and several liability is inappropriate;
a .court has discretion, within the established guidelines, to excuse
small contributors from joint and several liability. Thus, courts
that otherwise would choose one of the polar positions would be
encouraged, but not required, to moderate their positions in Su-
perfund cases, and over time a fairly specific and uniform federal
rule on joint and several liability in Superfund cases would
emerge, consistent with the Gore guidelines and the intent of
Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has made three principal arguments regarding
the application of Superfund's liability provisions to past generators
of hazardous waste. First, although Superfund's liability provisions
must be applied retroactively in order to impose clean-up liability
upon past non-negligent generators who disposed of their wastes
in off-site facilities, such application is authorized by the Act and
is not violative of any constitutional prohibition. Courts thus
should not hesitate to apply Superfund retroactively, and should
not entertain time-consuming constitutional attacks on the fairness
of the Act's liability provisions.
Second, although future generators who engage in contractually
arranged off-site disposal practices are subject to strict liability
under the Act for almost any clean-up costs incurred where their
wastes are involved, pre-enactment waste generators who used iden-
tical third party disposal procedures are subject only to a "due
care" standard. Although the "due care" standard is tougher than
240 See supra text accompanying notes 221-24.
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the negligence standard that existed at the time such past waste
generation and disposal occurred, it-is weaker than a strict liability
standard, and may prove to be an obstacle to full, recovery of
clean-up costs at some abandoned sites. In such cases, state en-
forcement agencies may be able to finance clean-up by suing past
generators under state common law, which has moved recently to-
ward declaring hazardous waste generation an ultrahazardous
activity, thus holding generators strictly and vicariously liable for
all damages caused by their wastes.241 Political factors compelled
Congress to shy away from imposing such a standard upon past
generators under Superfund, and courts should not ignore statutory
construction principles regarding retroactivity and claim that the
statute precludes use of the defense by both past and future gen-
erators using contractual third party disposal procedures.
Finally, this Comment has argued that, under Superfund,
Congress intended hazardous waste generators who cannot prove
what contribution to total damages were caused by their wastes
to be jointly and severally liable only if they cannot meet certain
criteria for relief from such liability. The courts should not seize
isolated interpretations of the ambiguous statutory language on
this issue to justify strict adherence to either the old or the modern
common-law rule regarding joint and several liability, as some
commentators have done.242  Nor should they simply conclude
that because the "purpose" of the Act was to clean up abandoned
sites, the Act should be read as imposing joint and several liability
simply because such an interpretation would most quickly and
easily achieve this goal.243 This interpretation does not accord the
legislative history its proper weight, and completely ignores the
last-minute compromise which clearly diluted the toughness of
the joint and several liability provisions to some degree. Instead,
courts should attempt earnestly to interpret the joint and several
liability provision in the manner that most accurately reflects
Congress's intent when it passed the Act, a task that requires an
understanding of the politics and strategy involved in the Act's
consideration. Although in some cases Congress's intended standard
(as embodied in the Gore guidelines) might make imposition of
241 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text
242 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 25, at 700 n.64 (joint and several liability im-
posed under the Act since common law imposes such liability); Note, supra note
149, at 1058 n.65 (statute makes no provision for joint and several liability).
243 This argument is made in Note, supra note 217, at 1182-95.
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joint and several liability inappropriate, thereby making it more
difficult for the government to recover fully its clean-up costs, courts
should nevertheless remain true to that intention while developing
a congressionally mandated uniform and detailed federal rule on
joint and several liability.
